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ABSTRACT 
 
Regardless of the strategic role that mining plays in South Africa‟s economic growth 
and development, there are perceptions that mining benefits are still enjoyed by a few 
elite individuals. This is partly due to high expectations from lower level workers in 
the sector and communities where mining takes place. Failures in the implementation 
of some of the policies that are social in nature are making people question the 
wisdom of the current mining legislation, the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act (MPRDA). The main question of this research paper is whether the 
MPRDA, in its current form, is a suitable mining legislative framework that can usher 
a better dispensation for all or whether there is a need to overhaul it in order to deliver 
the desired end results that are expected by the majority of South Africans. It is 
against this background that this research was undertaken, by studying best practice 
in other mining jurisdictions and conducting a survey of those involved in the South 
African mining sector. From the research and surveys, recommendations are 
proposed on what amendments could be effected on the MPRDA to make the South 
African mining sector more attractive and simultaneously, meet the citizens‟ 
expectations.  
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Glossary of Terms 
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AMD Acid Mine Drainage 
AMV African Mining Vision 
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2 
 
MNC Multi-National Corporation 
MPRDA Minerals and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
MSR Mine Site Rehabilitation 
MWP Mining Work Program 
NEMA National Environmental Management Act 
NEMPAA National Environmental Management Protected Areas Act 
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South African Code for Reporting of Mineral Resources and Mineral 
Reserves 
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SD Sustainable Development 
SEIA Socio Economic Impact Assessment 
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SLP Social Labour Plan 
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SOEs State Owned Entities 
STC Secondary Tax on Companies 
UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
USA Unites States of America 
UTM Universal Transversal Mercator 
VAT Value Added Tax 
WHT Withholding Taxes 
3 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Commercial mining activities in South Africa date as far as back as 1847, with 
European settlers exploiting copper deposits in the Springbok region of the 
Northern Cape on a commercial scale.  This was followed by the discovery of the 
Kimberlite pipes around 1869, which resulted in the commercial diamond 
diggings in Kimberly.  An enormous amount of capital injection went into the 
development of Kimberly‟s diamond industry.  The centre of interest shifted 
towards Johannesburg following the discovery of the gold belt which extended a 
distance of approximately 120 kilometres from the west to the eastern parts of the 
Witwatersrand region.  This discovery led to a gold rush with an influx of both 
skilled and unskilled labour from all over the globe in pursuit of the wealth that 
was offered by the new developing gold mining industry.  This period also saw 
substantial financial investment into South Africa mainly to fund the exploitation 
of the Gold Reefs.  The new gold mining industry had strategic, political and 
economic importance as it guaranteed wealth to the political administration of the 
time.  During 1899-1902, the Afrikaans and British English settlers went to war 
(the Anglo-Boer War) for control of the Gold industry.  The British settlers 
emerged victorious, which enabled them to administer the gold and the diamond 
industry (SAIMM, 2012; ANC, 2012). 
 
Today mining still plays an important role in the South African domestic 
economy, as the country possesses extensive and diverse mineral resource 
endowment, as indicated in Table 1 below. An independent evaluation estimates 
the in-situ mineral wealth of South Africa at USD 2.5 trillion (DMR, 2012). 
Globally, South Africa boasts the largest reserves of Platinum Group Metals 
(PGMs), chrome ore and fluorspar.  Along with these, it has the second largest 
known reserves of gold, manganese and vanadium.  It also has significant reserves 
of uranium, coal, nickel, antimony, phosphate rock and zinc, making South Africa 
a key source of minerals for the global economy (DMR, 2012).  
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The South African Mineral Industry (SAMI) annual report for 2012/13 indicated 
that the mining industry still continues to play a strategic role in South Africa‟s 
economic growth and development.  In 2012, mining contributed 9,3% to the 
GDP and 12,4% to the Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) of the country.  
The contribution of primary mineral export sales, which was R 269,1 billion, 
accounted for 35,1% of the total exports of goods.  The total State revenue from 
the mining sector, which includes assessed tax, provisional tax and secondary tax, 
was R12,8 billion in that period.  During 2001-2011, the mining sector created a 
total of 89 004 direct jobs indicating the significance of mining to the country‟s 
economy.  In 2012 the sector employed 2,9% of South Africa‟s economically 
active population.  This figure excludes those people employed in exploration, 
research and development organisations, and head offices (DMR, 2013). 
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Table 1:  South Africa’s Mineral Reserves World Ranking, 2009 Production & Nominal Life (Assuming No Further Reserves) at 2009 Extraction Rate 
 
Source: SAMI 2009/2010, DMR (2010) 
MINERAL  RESERVES PRODUCTION 2009 LIFE 
  Mass %World Rank Mass %World Rank Years 
Alumino-silicates Mt 51 * * 0.265 60.2 1 192 
Antimony Kt 350 16.7 3 3 1.6 3 117 
Chromium Ore Mt 5500 72.4 1 6.762 * 1 813 
Coal Mt 30408 7.4 6 250.6 3.6 7 121 
Copper Mt 13 2.4 6 0.089 * * 146 
Fluorspar Mt 80 17 2 0.18 3.5 5 444 
Gold T 6000 12.7 1 197 7.8 5 30 
Iron Ore  Mt 1500 0.8 13 55.4 3.5 6 27 
Iron Ore  - incl. BC Mt 25000 ~10 * 55.4 3.5 6 451 
Lead Kt 3000 2.1 6 49 1.2 10 61 
Manganese Ore Mt 4000 80 1 4.576 17.1 2 874 
Nickel Mt 3.7 5.2 8 0.0346 2.4 12 107 
PGMs T 70000 87.7 1 271 58.7 1 258 
Phosphate Rock Mt 2500 5.3 4 2.237 1.4 11 1118 
Titanium Minerals Mt 71 9.8 2 1.1 19.2 2 65 
Titanium- incl. BC Mt 400 65 1 1.1 19.2 2 364 
Uranium Kt 435 8 4 0.623 1.3 10 698 
Vanadium Kt 12000 32 2 11.6 25.4 1 1034 
Vermiculite Mt 80 40 2 0.1943 35 1 412 
Zinc Mt 15 3.3 8 0.029 0.2 25 517 
Zirconium Mt 14 25 2 0.395 32 2 35 
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South Africa is a middle-income emerging market with an abundant supply of 
natural resources, as well as well-developed financial, legal, communications, 
energy, and transport sectors.  The country hosts the seventeenth largest stock 
exchange in the world and a well maintained modern infrastructure, which 
maintains an efficient distribution of goods to major urban centres throughout the 
region.  Since 2004, the domestic economy has experienced macro-economic 
stability until the on setting of the global economic recession in the third quarter 
of 2008 (Brand South Africa, 2013).  South Africa‟s economic policy is 
economically conservative but pragmatic, focusing on controlling inflation, 
maintaining a budget surplus, and using state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to deliver 
services that would be expensive if provided by the private sector as well as to 
mitigate against market failure (Brand South Africa, 2013).  Linkages which span 
from tertiary the country also boasts well developed spatial linkages in the form of 
a good transport network, rail, ports and road infrastructure that is supported by a 
well advanced knowledge institutions to science councils (ANC , 2012).  Over the 
years, the South African mining industry has developed critical backward and 
forward linkages.  The backward linkages include the available inputs for mineral 
development projects.  These include machinery to mine, consumables, the 
relevant mining and geo-engineering services, as well as an established financial 
service sector and environmental management services and consultancy firms.  
Through investment in Research and Development (R&D) easily adaptable 
mineral processing technology exists within the domestic mining industry which 
has given rise to the development of semi-manufactured products.  
 
1.1. Rationale and Problem Statement  
Mining is a sector that is targeted to contribute to the sustainable socio-economic 
growth of mineral-hosting nations, as it has features which differentiate it from 
other sectors of a nation‟s economy and from other extractive activities like the 
extraction of oil and gas.  The unique features are largely associated with the 
notion that mining is concerned with the removal of non-renewable resources, 
which are public assets that need to be exploited with the public as beneficiaries.  
Secondly, as mining is about digging a hole in the ground, if not managed 
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properly, these activities can destroy the environment, which can have severe 
socio-economic impacts on the lives of people living in the vicinity of mining 
operations.  Thirdly, the mining sector is an international industry that offers 
developing countries dollar-based revenues, which present much needed foreign 
earnings associated with a strong global currency compared to local currencies.  
This makes the industry an important source for government revenue.  The 
challenge is to develop appropriate instruments to manage the minerals sector 
through the development and implementation of an adequate mineral policy 
(Bond, 2002). 
 
A mineral policy is an instrument used by mineral-hosting nations to declare their 
unique interests pertaining to their minerals sector, as an attempt to enable mineral 
endowed nations to benefit from mineral resource development (Otto and Cordes, 
2002).  Otto (1997) stated that mineral policies are developed in relation to 
political, economic, technological and geological advancements exclusive to a 
particular mineral-hosting nation.  As illustrated by Mutemeri et al (2010), a 
mineral-hosting nation‟s mineral policy expresses the host nation‟s requirements 
relating to the exploitation and exploration of the country‟s mineral wealth, with 
the mineral regulatory regime developed to guide both the public and private 
sectors‟ conduct relating to mineral development.  Mineral regulatory regime 
outlines the perimeters for tolerable behaviour in mineral development projects.  
Pedro (2004) also noted that the tools to encourage transparency, the appropriate 
management and distribution of benefits emanating from the minerals industry 
have become an important feature in the development of a mineral policy.  Otto 
and Cordes (2002) advocated that contemporary mineral policy topics were being 
developed with a strategic intent to guide the mineral industry to contribute 
towards sustainable development.  The content of a mineral policy framework 
may consist of the scope, autonomy, mineral resource rent and tax, sustainable 
development, regulatory framework and governing agencies (Otto and Cordes, 
2002).  
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Eggert (2004) indicated that the accumulation and the distribution of basic 
geological information was an additional topic which needed to be clearly 
articulated in a mineral policy.  He went on to explain that modern mineral 
policies were being developed with a view of granting greater access to mineral 
resources.  This is due to mineral policies that tended to offer clear and transparent 
licensing arrangements and the security of tenure which granted mining 
companies the opportunity to transfer exploration and mining rights, thus allowing 
mining companies to trade their produce on profitable terms.  
 
As suggested by Otto (1997), the majority of African mineral-hosting nations 
have predominantly being under the control of colonial influences in varying 
degrees.  This translated to financial and skills-intensive mineral projects being 
largely owned and operated by foreign entities from the colonial metropolis.  In 
essence, mineral development projects in Africa during the colonial period and to 
a large extent even beyond the 1960s were not exploited for the economic 
development of African economies (Pedro, 2007; Otto and Cordes, 2002).  
 
Mtegha (2002) argued that post-colonial African states increased government‟s 
control and in some areas, government was granted complete ownership of 
mineral enterprises so as to enable the independent state to assure its sovereignty 
and autonomy over the former colonial powers.  This was primarily an effort to 
transfer the wealth that had been enjoyed by the colonial powers to the post-
colonial African states.  However, in South Africa, the post-apartheid period is an 
epoch in which the state and its structures are committed to transforming the 
economy to enable the economic benefits of the country to be shared by all South 
Africans with preferential treatment being given to Historically Disadvantaged 
South Africans (HDSA‟s) (Ndaba, 2010).  As in other mineral-hosting countries 
in the developing world, the South African mineral sector is also a significant 
driver of economic growth and development (Ndaba, 2010).  The mining sector is 
one of the sectors expected to contribute not only to socio-economic development 
of the country but is also in the priority list for transformation in South Africa 
(Ndaba, 2010; Cawood, 2004). Transformation, Sustainable Development (SD), 
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Mine Health and Safety, Research and Development (R&D), mine labour force 
stability, access to sufficient energy supply, regulatory certainty, and the 
globalization of South Africa‟s mineral resources are the central issues impacting 
on the ownership, management and development of the South African minerals 
industry (Cawood, 2005; Mtegha et al, 2010).   
 
South Africa‟s mineral policy, the White Paper on Minerals and Mining Policy for 
South Africa of October 1998, is comprised of six themes that were identified as 
being vital to the transparent, adequate management and steering domestic 
mineral resource exploitation towards a sustainable development trajectory, 
namely: 
 “Business Climate and Mineral Development. 
 Participation in Ownership and Management. 
 People issues. 
 Environmental Management. 
 Regional Co-operation. 
 Governance” 
(DME, 1998). 
 
Regardless of the positive role played by the mining sector in the South African 
economy, there are perceptions, mainly from the underprivileged South African 
black population, that mining benefits are enjoyed by a few elite individuals 
mainly comprised of the white population and a few politically connected black 
bourgeoisies.  This view has been fuelled by the mining industry‟s limited ability 
to meet the objectives enshrined in South Africa‟s mineral legislation,  the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA), 
mainly: 
 “Transformation of the minerals and mining industry. 
 Promotion of equitable access to South Africa‟s mineral resources. 
 Promotion of investment in exploration, mining and mineral 
beneficiation. 
 Socio-economic development of South Africa. 
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 Environmental sustainability of the mining industry”. 
 
(MPRDA, 2002) 
 
The high expectations from lower level workers in the mining sector, coupled 
with dissatisfaction of mining‟s limited contribution to socio-economic 
development of communities proximate to mining operations and mining Labour 
Sending Areas (LSAs), illustrates the enormous challenges in the implementation 
and realisation of the MPRDA‟s objectives and its supporting regulatory 
frameworks, the Broad Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter known as 
the Mining Charter and the Social and Labour Plans (SLP).   
 
The main concerns which led to the commencement of this research project are:  
(a) Whether the MPRDA is a suitable mining legislative framework to enable the 
minerals sector to adequately contribute to the sustainable exploitation of South 
Africa‟s mineral resources?  
(b) Have there been difficulties in the implementation of the Act?  
(c) Is there merit in looking at an alternative mineral policy and legislative 
framework that will be effective in enabling the sustainable exploitation of South 
Africa‟s mineral wealth? 
 
1.2. Objective of the Study 
The central objective of this study is to assess the South African mineral 
regulatory regime in relation to global practices in using mineral legislation as an 
instrument to enable mineral-hosting nations to promote the sustainable 
exploitation of their mineral endowment.  This research project also aims to assess 
the ability of the state in utilising its mineral regulatory mandate in order to steer 
the South African mineral industry towards a sustainable development trajectory.  
 
1.3. Research methodology 
Using a qualitative research methodology, the study is conducted in a four -
pronged approach.  The first phase reviews a variety of mineral legislations from a 
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number of mineral hosting regions to identify the mechanisms developed to 
promote the sustainable exploitation of a nation‟s mineral resource heritage.  The 
six themes emanating from South Africa‟s 1998 White Paper, namely: business 
climate and mineral development; participation in ownership and management; 
people issues; environmental management; regional co-operation and governance, 
were initially going to be used as positions of analysis.  Instead the research uses 
the guidelines advocated by the World Bank as essential in ensuring host nation‟s 
mineral regulatory regimes are aligned to the sustainable exploitation of its 
mineral wealth. 
 
The second phase of this research project was executed through conducting a 
survey in a form of a questionnaire that is comprised of international and South 
African practises in the development and implementation of minerals legislation. 
The survey was distributed to a number of stakeholders with extensive experience 
in both the public and private activities of the South African mining industry as to 
obtain their perspectives on the formulation and implementation of a mining 
regulatory regime.  The third phase was confined to an empirical analysis of the 
mineral legislation coupled with scrutinising and summarising the data collected 
from the survey.  The fourth phase concludes the research project by utilising the 
research findings from the above phases to recommend an alternative mineral 
regulatory regime for the sustainable exploitation of South Africa‟s mineral 
resource heritage. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
This literature review discusses the underlying theory of this research project.  To 
do this, it unpacks the requirements for a mineral-hosting nation to formulate an 
adequate minerals policy.  The chapter also provides an explanation of the mineral 
legislation as being the only device that should guide investors in obtaining either 
an exploration or mining right.  The chapter also introduces the different systems 
of state ownership in the mining industry. 
 
Liberal policies, particularly those relating to democracy, human rights, and 
Sustainable Development (SD), have become influential in mineral policy 
formulation.  When developing a mineral policy, Mtegha (2004) articulated that 
mineral-hosting nations need to adhere to all political and economic factors, 
which should advise the required in-depth information to be collected about their 
domestic mineral sector.  The state‟s capability to formulate a mineral policy 
stretches far beyond technical skills as it is also reliant on other skills which may 
include mineral investment analysis, mineral law, environmental management, 
sustainable development, communication and facilitation (Mtegha, 2004; Otto and 
Cordes, 2002; Pedro, 2007). 
 
Contemporary mineral legislative frameworks clearly illustrate the mineral-
hosting nation‟s position in relation to the management of its nation‟s mineral 
resource heritage.  Mineral hosting nations have developed various criteria 
required for an investor to be allowed to gain access to their mineral resources 
(Tsikata, 2004).  The mineral legislation should clearly articulate these criteria and 
should not be ambiguous in order to enable prospective investors to fully 
understand the rules of mining (Barberis, 1998).  The mineral legislation should 
be the only device which guides investors in obtaining a right to mine supported 
by a transparent and objective legal process.  Mining Agreements (MAs) have 
become popular and useful as they are a form of a binding agreement between the 
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mining company and the government linked to the specific conditions affecting a 
particular mining project (Barberis, 1998).  
 
One of the most important aspects of mineral investments is for the mineral-host 
nation to guarantee security of tenure to investors and clarify the nature of the 
mineral right – whether it is exclusive or it is expected to be shared with other 
mining companies (Tsikata, 2004).  Generally, host nations offer three types of 
mineral rights tenure; these were defined by Naito et al (2001) as ad hoc 
exploration tenure, open-ended or long duration exploration tenure and extensions 
to defined exploration tenure. 
 
Mineral-hosting nations are obliged to develop mineral policies that will 
contribute to the sustainable exploitation of their non-renewable mineral resources 
as to ensure that both present and future generations enjoy the benefits of the 
depleted non-renewable mineral resource (Ndaba, 2010; Eggert, 2004; Pedro, 
2007; Otto and Cordes, 2002).  To achieve this, host nations develop mineral 
investment contractual obligations to coerce investors to contribute towards 
national development objectives (Tsikata, 2004).  Furthermore, the upliftment of 
locals living in close proximity to mineral development projects has become a 
strict requirement to be met in order to be granted a mining right.  This is evident 
in a variety of mineral regulatory regimes and in MAs.  This requirement allows 
mineral development projects to contribute towards the advancement of local 
economies.  To fully localise the socio-economic benefits of mining, a number of 
instruments are utilised.  These instruments include the development of 
employment quotas, skills development programs, public private sector research 
and development initiatives, incentives to develop local suppliers and the 
promotion of mineral beneficiation (UNECA, 2004; Ndaba, 2010; Heller, 2011). 
 
As countries follow different legal systems, the provisions relating to the 
ownership and exploitation of minerals differ.  Some mineral-hosting nations own 
mineral rights, while in other nations mineral ownership is aligned to surface land 
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ownership or ownership can be vested in both the state and private landowners 
(Tsikata, 2004).  There are generally five systems of ownership that have been 
pursued by host nations, namely, compulsory joint venturing, compulsory 
contracting or participation, preferential competition, non-preferential competition 
and privatisation (Naito et al, 2001).  Regardless of the type of mineral ownership 
regime in place, the mineral legislation of any mineral-hosting nation needs to 
articulate the government‟s position pertaining to the state‟s authority on the 
minerals sector, conditions of access to mineral-holding lands, guidelines on 
exploration, guidelines to the granting of mining rights, obligations with holding a 
mining right/permit, guidelines on the protection of the environment and fiscal 
legislation (Naito et al 2001). 
 
In concluding this chapter it is clear that a mineral policy is influenced by a host 
nations political and socio economic conditions.  The development of a mineral 
policy requires cross sectoral skills.  The mineral legislation should allow the host 
nation to effectively manage its mineral sector along with the sectors impacted by 
the mining industry.  The management of the mining sector should be geared 
towards steering mineral development towards a sustainable development 
trajectory.  The rules of mining should be clear and direct to allow for ease of 
compliance by investors and to enable the host nation to regulate mineral 
development projects.  MAs are also being utilised to meet the unique demands of 
specific mining projects.  Clarifying the nature of a mineral right and guaranteeing 
security of tenure are of the utmost importance in a mineral investment contract. 
 
Ownership and exploitation of mineral resources is influenced by host nation‟s 
economic policies.  In some host nations ownership of minerals is vested within 
the state as the custodian of minerals for its nation.  While other host nation‟s 
mineral ownership is vested in private hands, either owned by the surface land 
owner or private investors.  There are various types of ownership instruments used 
by host nations when the state is also an investor in the domestic mining industry.  
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It is however important that mineral ownership requirements are clearly defined 
within the realm of the law. 
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3. DEFINING THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
 
This chapter deliberates on the overall responsibility of the state and its 
institutions in utilising its mineral resource heritage in achieving political and 
socio-economic stability within its borders.  The strengthening of the state to 
correctly use its mineral regulatory devices is discussed.  The chapter also 
discusses the different ownership models that host nations can adopt in 
participating in mineral enterprises. 
 
Louw (1978) described national security as the condition of freedom from internal 
and external political and economic dangers enjoyed by a state.  The responsibility 
of the state is therefore aligned to the strict provision of economic and political 
security for its citizenry.  The state and its institutions are therefore enshrined with 
the responsibility to develop and employ the appropriate mechanisms that provide 
both political and economic stability within its borders.  As the tax-collection 
agent, the state needs to be innovative and responsible in ensuring that all 
revenues collected are used to maintain a principled political and economic 
climate or, simply put, to maintain political and economic national security. 
 
In relation to the mineral sector, the state‟s role is associated with the protection 
and promotion of the sustainable exploitation of the nation‟s mineral resource 
heritage.  On the ground, mineral resources have an enormous potential for wealth 
generation.  It is government‟s role to ensure that the removal of these non-
renewable resources is conducted in a manner which will ensure that the long term 
political and economic stability of the nation is maintained (Eggert, 2002).  The 
African Mining Vision (2009) promotes government‟s role in ensuring the 
integration of the mining industry into a nation‟s economy through the 
development of mineral linkages to other sectors of the economy and the 
advancement of the nation state‟s geo-surveying capacity (Jourdan, 2010). 
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The strategic importance of the minerals industry forces the state to intervene to 
ensure that industry practitioners comply with the mineral-hosting nation‟s 
mineral policy objectives.  The state participation can be associated with 
economic and non-economic objectives.  Non-economic state participation is 
primarily associated with the state‟s regulatory function to steer mineral 
development towards mineral policy objectives, while economic participation is 
associated with the state‟s ownership in its domestic mineral sector (ANC, 2012). 
SAIMM (2012) gives an in-depth illustration of state ownership, which is 
described as the state owning equity in domestic mineral enterprises.  Ownership 
varies from complete ownership, carried equity agreements, unpaid equity 
arrangements or even minority equity arrangements (ANC, 2012).  In practice, 
mineral-hosting nations employ control and ownership approaches unique to their 
respective mineral policy objectives.  Naito et al (2001) identified five forms of 
ownership and control employed by mineral hosting nations, namely: 
 Compulsory joint venturing:  Investors are compelled to enter into joint 
venture agreements with the state or a state owned entity as the only option to 
receive a mining right.  This approach is generally pursued by countries with a 
great degree of state intervention in the economy.  This regime is not 
appealing to private investors.   
 Compulsory contracting or participation:  Private investors are compelled 
to obtain a contract to mineral rights or offer equity to the state or a state 
owned entity.  As practiced in Colombia private investors are forced to enter 
into adhesion contracts with the state or negotiate exploration and mineral 
development contracts with state owned entities.  This type of regime is 
entrenched in Botswana‟s mineral legislation enabling the state to gain equity 
in all diamond projects. 
 Preferential competition:  This regime offers preferential and superior 
treatment to the state and state owned enterprises through mineral legislation 
that grants the state special rights to what it deems to be strategic minerals and 
areas.  In some cases, private entities are allowed to obtain and explore with or 
compete against the state. 
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 Non-preferential competition:  This regime is probably the most practised.  
The state is allowed to compete with private entities on an equal footing.  The 
state is usually active in the domestic minerals sector through the use of a state 
owned mining company. 
 Privatisation:  This regime has been adopted by a number of mineral hosting 
nations who had previously nationalised their economies.  Due to the need to 
attract private investment, the economy has been privatised to entice the 
private sector.  
 
Regardless of the ownership and control approach employed, the governance of 
mineral wealth is the most important factor in the realisation of mineral policy 
objectives.  A mineral policy should be linked with other national policies as 
mining projects are connected with other sectors of the economy.  It is important 
that national policies should be harmonised and that institutional and policy 
mandate divergence be minimised.  Furthermore, the mineral policy should 
articulate its position relative to other national policies (Otto, 1997).  The strategic 
coordination and alignment of a nation‟s institutions and policies is essential in 
ensuring the achievement of mineral policy objectives.  The lack of institutional 
and policy coherence, particularly between the government departments 
responsible for the realisation of the minerals policy, may lead to the 
disarticulation of the objectives enshrined in a mineral policy.  To achieve 
institutional and policy coherence several mineral hosting nations have established 
super economic ministries comprised of all ministries with an economic 
development mandate. An example of this is Norway, where the ministries of 
Geological Survey, Mines, and Trade and Industry are combined and managed as 
a single ministry, rallying towards a central objective of industrialisation.  This 
trend is also evident in Finland, where the ministry of Economic Development 
and Employment are combined.  These institutional arrangements are termed 
Coherent Minerals Governance (ANC, 2012). 
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In conclusion, the state‟s overall responsibility is to protect the interests of its 
citizens.  The state is bestowed with the important responsibility of utilising its 
mineral resources for the empowerment of its citizens.  The state should employ 
the correct regulatory instruments to utilise its mineral wealth for the 
empowerment of its people.  It can achieve this through adequate mineral 
regulation and/or direct participation through ownership in its domestic mineral 
industry by using any of the following five forms of ownership. These are: 
compulsory joint venturing, compulsory contracting or participation, preferential 
competition, non-preferential competition, and privatisation. 
The type of mineral ownership adopted should be aligned to other national 
policies to achieve policy coherence across the various sectors of the economy. 
Policy harmonisation is important as the mining sector impacts other sectors of 
the economy, and is not a stand-alone sector as it is usually perceived to be. 
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4. THE MINERAL-HOSTING NATION’S REGULATORY FUNCTION  
 
This chapter discusses the fundamental elements considered by a host nation when 
deciding on granting permission to investors for the exploitation of its mineral 
resource heritage.  The chapter also assesses the capacity required to adequately 
administer the minerals sector.  The assessment also investigates the type of 
authority required to manage the minerals sector.  
 
The chapter then goes on to assess the contemporary principles which guide 
mineral-hosting nations on the approaches to be employed when participating in 
mineral development projects where the host nation is an equity partner with the 
private investor.  In such a partnership it aims to unearth an equal risk sharing 
formulae between the state and the private investor.  
Additionally, this chapter looks at various instruments that mineral-hosting 
nations employ in directing their respective mineral industries in contributing to 
economic development. .It further discusses the different models used by 
Indonesia, Philippines and Chile in linking mineral development projects with the 
host nations overall national economic development objectives. 
 
Tsikata (2004) declared that in customary international law, a sovereign state has 
the right to decide on the foreign investors it will allow within its borders, as well 
as sectors and areas that foreign investors can operate in coupled with the terms of 
operation.  In relation to permitting foreign investors to gain access to states‟ 
mineral resources, the following four themes, as identified by Tsikata (2004), are 
commonly used as mechanisms by mineral hosting governments to grant 
permission to mineral exploitation: 
1. “The determination of areas available. 
2. How decisions regarding grants are made. 
3. Who is empowered to make a grant or who participates in the decision; 
and 
4. Concerns arising from environmental considerations” 
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(Tsikata, 2004; pp 51) 
 
A host nation‟s mineral regulatory framework gives expression to that nation‟s 
minerals policy.  The implementation of a mineral law can be conducted through 
various state agencies and government administrative devices.  These need to 
adhere to and reflect the various sectorial conditions within the mining legislation 
impacting on other sectors of the economy, which usually include the 
environment, tax, land, labour, housing, and safety.  Although various methods 
are adopted in mineral regulatory frameworks, the following three trends are often 
used: 
 
1. Both exploration and mining rights emanate from a central authorisation 
awarded as a lease, licence or concession granted using a law which 
applies uniformly to the granting of rights and the associated obligations 
for each type of mineral resource. 
2. Obligations are clearly illustrated in an agreement which overtakes the 
overall mineral regulatory framework of a mineral-hosting nation. 
3. In other cases, obligations and responsibilities associated with holding a 
mineral right are usually conducted in an ad-hoc manner to complement or 
overtake the overarching mineral legislation. 
(Otto, 1997) 
 
The mineral legislation needs to clearly reflect the legal requirements for mineral 
exploitation in a particular country.  This, therefore, requires that the legislation 
should be aligned to the political and economic climate at the time when a foreign 
investor aims to exploit a nation‟s mineral resource (Barberis, 1998).  Mutemeri et 
al (2010) suggests that an adequate mineral regulatory framework should not only 
illustrate government‟s requirements relating to mineral development projects but 
should also ensure that mineral hosting nations are able to benefit from their 
mineral sector.  As noted by Otto (1997) in practice, mineral legislation can be 
implemented with emphasis being given to the legal elements of a Minerals Act to 
coerce holders of mineral rights to operate within the realms of the mineral 
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legislation while other host nations have opted to focus on practical solutions 
developed for a specific case. 
 
To be effective in regulating the unique projects within the sector, host 
governments use regulatory devices aligned to the distinctiveness of a mineral 
development project.  Both ad-hoc and model agreements are used.  Ad-hoc 
agreements are associated with an agreement that is developed particularly in line 
with the unique characteristics of a particular mineral development project, while 
model agreements are utilised to regulate a number of mining projects who have 
similar characteristics.  The general practice observed thus far, as pointed out by 
Otto (1997), is that the agreement reached between a mineral-hosting nation and 
the private investor supersedes the general mining legislation.  This usually 
happens when the agreement does not disrupt public order.  These negotiated 
agreements are generally associated with large mining projects where the 
agreement is required to be aligned to all the operational agreements pertaining to 
the lenders, government, contractors, company, local community, and labour. 
 
Barberis (1998) complimented the views advocated by Otto (1997) as she argued 
that in cases where the mineral legislation is outdated or it no longer reflects the 
mineral-hosting nation‟s contemporary position regarding its mineral resources, 
the drafting of Mining Agreements (MAs) has proven to be beneficial to both 
parties.  The mining law still is used as the legal authority to guide mineral 
exploitation.  MAs are identified as adequate instruments to articulate a mineral-
hosting nation‟s mineral policy as they can also be used to declare the 
contemporary position of the mineral-hosting nation.  This has proven to be 
advantageous for both the state and the investor as the MA can be formulated 
according to the actual project at hand and aligned to both the prevailing domestic 
and international economic as well as political conditions (Barberis, 1998).  MAs 
have been described as being advantageous in several respects as, among others, 
they enable the mineral hosting government to implement its mineral policy 
without having to constantly revise its mineral legislation, thereby providing relief 
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to investors as a contract creates a level of stability.  Other advantages of MAs are 
listed below as identified by Barberis (1998), namely: 
 “In the absence of centralised legislative bodies in the world arena, 
agreements represent the closest approach to a considered and deliberate 
prescription of future policies, a process that is the characteristic function 
of constitutive and legislative bodies in the municipal arena. 
 Agreements create uniformity of expectations, a uniformity that may 
ultimately have the force of law. 
 Agreements are persuasive strategies for the possession and sharing of 
values. 
 MAs are the best means for the government to adapt the national 
investment environment to match its current policy.  Because they are such 
rapid vehicles of government policy, MAs can be used to tackle modern 
issues which are not dealt with in out-dated Mining Codes. 
 Moreover, a single MA is needed to provide for the numerous issues that 
would otherwise require a multiplicity of permits and administrative 
authorisations.   
 The MA also has the advantage of providing for the technical complexity 
connected with the multiple issues of large-scale projects.  Indeed, due to 
the important size of large-mining projects, some contractual clauses such 
as the tax computation issues, as well as security and environmental issues 
will require more detailed complicated and unique solutions.  The 
technology used in large-scale projects will also be more complex and 
must be adapted to the mine‟s characteristics. 
 In addition the Foreign Mining Company (FMC) and/or the Government 
may wish to use rules that are different from those stated in the legislated 
provisions.  For example, the investor may seek to pay lower than 
expected economic rents, and the Government may require more stringent 
conditions regarding environmental protection.  Furthermore, 
infrastructure agreements maybe needed to determine which of the parties 
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will provide the infrastructure necessary for the exploitation of the mine 
and the transportation of the minerals; to analyse the technical 
complexity; to discuss the uncertainties and to solve the detailed and 
difficult questions – all issues which stem from the scale of the project. 
 Another reason for using MAs is that they may deal with local concerns in 
a better fashion.  Besides the great principle of policy expressed in a 
country‟s laws and regulations regarding the protection of native people, 
the impact of the exploitation of natural resources on a local community 
can be tackled in detail in a negotiated agreement.  These issues may be 
part of the main agreement concluded between the FMC and the Host 
Country (HC) on behalf of the local community.  Another possibility for 
the mining investor is to negotiate directly with the local community.  This 
formula has been used recently in the USA and in Australia.  In Indonesia, 
the impact of mining on the local community is always addressed locally.  
If any resettlement is required, this will be negotiated by a team usually 
consisting of local leaders, regional government representatives, possibly 
a representative of the Mines Department from the central government, 
and company representatives. 
 Finally, another advantage in using a contractual regime to grant a 
mining lease lies in the investors‟ belief that this system may give the deal 
certain stability.  When mining rights are granted through a regulatory 
system, the investors may fear that some subsequent government 
legislation might modify the clauses of the mining authorisation, thus 
leading to substantial changes in rights and obligation.  In such a case, 
the foreign investor has practically no recourse, and may have little option 
but to comply with the new „rules of the game‟.  Therefore, when investors 
are suspicious of how a government may use its legislative powers, they 
may look for the relative stability provided by an MA.   
 However, an MA is certainly not an absolute guarantee of the stability of 
the contractual provisions, despite the principle of „sanctity of contract‟.  
Indeed, this principle is not always respected by national governments 
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and, once again, the investors risk seeing the contractual clauses 
unilaterally modified during the life of the contract”(Barberis, 1998, pp 
50-51) 
 
4.1. Delegation of Authority in the Issuing of Mineral Rights 
The guiding principles in the granting of mineral rights need to be clearly 
articulated in the mineral law with regard to the issuing of those rights and the 
regulation of their use.  International best practise shows that the authority to 
establish these principles should not be vested to the delegated executive authority 
or governmental unit as the decision regarding the granting of mineral rights will 
be subjective and exposed to the discretion of one individual or governmental unit 
without offering the courts the opportunity to offer legal oversight.  As practised 
in other leading mining jurisdictions such as Chile, Mexico, Bolivia and Peru, the 
steps taken to grant mineral rights is outlined in the mineral law as opposed to 
being left at the discretion of a senior government official responsible for the 
regulation of the mineral industry.  Other mineral hosting states such as Botswana, 
Madagascar, Tanzania and Mongolia have practiced this method (Barberis, 1998; 
Otto and Cordes, 2002).  However, in circumstances where the Minister or a 
senior government official has the authority to grant mineral rights, there is merit 
in developing mechanisms and steps that will be prescribed in the mineral law as 
guidelines to be followed in the issuing of those rights.  This will offer some 
degree of objectivity in the steps followed in the issuing of mineral rights as it is 
important for investors to understand the process as they would have already spent 
substantial amounts of money on exploration activities.  Furthermore, it is 
inconceivable that a single person will be able to constantly approve mining rights 
in a situation where a country is receiving continuous investment, unless the 
responsibility can be shared or delegated to other competent state officials 
(Barberis, 1998). 
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4.2. Access to Mineral Resources by Companies 
Mutemeri et al (2010) asserts that traditionally two processes are utilised in 
allocating mineral rights: the competitive, or what has become known as the 
tender process, and the free-entry system.  Bello et al (2013) states that it is 
common for mineral legislation to accommodate both processes provided that 
they are not utilised simultaneously.  These processes are merely used for 
managing the allocation of mineral rights and are not a methodology.  The 
adopting of one of these processes is influenced by the following factors as 
discussed by Mutemeri et al (2010): 
 
 The high risk associated with a mineral host nation that has very limited 
geological knowledge of its mineral heritage, the free-entry system is 
mostly likely to be employed. 
 The greater availability of geological information insures a less risky 
investment environment and results in a higher possibility of employing 
the competitive tender process. 
 
Otto (1997) argued that the competitive bidding system in the allocation of 
mineral rights has a potential to resolve tension associated with conflicting 
application conditions.  He went on to state that the bidding system was mostly 
used to allocate oil exploration tracts and that the process was very challenging to 
implement in the mining industry., as evidenced in the fact that many Asian and 
transitional economies endowed with mineral resources found the bidding system 
to be problematic and, ultimately, unsuccessful Bello et al (2013) maintained that 
competitive resource allocation systems is a useful alternative method in the 
allocation of mineral prospecting and mining rights when one considers the 
following positive attributes of the competitive resource allocation systems, 
namely : 
 Offers the mineral hosting nation the potential to acquire a significant 
share of economic rents of mineral resources. 
 Compels the state to have a good knowledge of its mineral resource 
heritage as this information is required in the auctioning process. 
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 Well-designed competitive resource allocation systems promote the 
enforcement of greater transparency in the rights allocation process. 
 Competitive bidding systems have the potential to specify clear and 
transparent rights allocation processes and procedures which can 
decrease prospects of abuse and corruption. 
 
To successfully implement a well-structured competitive bidding system, a fair 
market related evaluation criteria needs to be utilised with geological information, 
timelines and all of the bidding information to be presented and understood by 
potential bidders (Bello et al, 2013).  As illustrated by Barberis (1998), access to 
mineral reserves of a sovereign state is largely aligned to that nation‟s culture and 
attitude towards foreign investors.  Countries who endorse liberal economic 
policies tend to have fewer restrictions on access to their mineral resources while 
mineral-hosting nations that have adopted less liberal policies customarily develop 
policy mechanisms that form entry barriers to the exploitation of their non-
renewable mineral resource heritage.  Various mineral policy instruments are 
utilised by mineral hosting nations to grant access for mineral resource 
exploitation.  These instruments include liberating reserves, maintaining an open 
title registry, the provision of mineral rights through standardised agreements or 
permits/leases. 
 
4.2.1. Liberating reserves 
Liberating of reserves is usually practised by mineral-hosting nations who 
embraced previously socialist policies and are now moving towards more liberal, 
investor friendly regimes by freeing unexplored and exploited territories that had 
been reserved for state owned enterprises.  Numerous policy and legislative 
instruments are developed to enable the private sector to gain access to previously 
state owned mineral holdings as an effort to attract Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI).  Joint ventures (JVs) between SOEs and the private sector can be pursued.  
SOEs are expected to adhere to the overarching mineral legislative framework and 
compete with private mining companies.  This move compels the state to release a 
portion of its mineral holdings to avoid unproductive costs.  Host nations have 
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generally favoured JVs if there are mineral assets deemed to be valuable and of 
strategic economic importance or engage in public mining auctions of areas where 
the state has already conducted primary exploration activities with known deposits 
with less strategic importance (Naito et al 2001). 
 
4.2.2. Maintaining an open title registry 
An open title registry has become a common feature in a number of mineral 
jurisdictions who enjoy different levels of economic development such as in 
Canada, Australia, the United States of America (USA), Chile, Mexico, 
Botswana, Tanzania and the People‟s Republic of China (PRC).  These countries 
use an open title registry, which is a system that offers potential investors an 
insight into the existence of mineral deposits, available deposits and areas that 
have already been awarded for mineral development projects.  This system has 
proven to reduce the time associated with the issuing of mineral rights as the 
system is comprised of a mining cadastre (a system which locates exploration and 
mining claim areas).  It is integrated onto a computerised mineral title recording 
system that has a standardised shape and form of concessions that enables the 
identification of a boundary to assist the state in not overlapping claims.  (Naito et 
al 2001) 
 
In practice, mineral-hosting nations use an open title registry system that is unique 
to their concerns and requirements as there is an existence of irregularly shaped 
concessions which enable the exact tracking of an ore body and to avoid excess 
holdings.  These are harder to administer as they require close inspection, making 
them longer to process and they have proven to be erroneous.  However, other 
nations have adopted easier to administer title mining cadastre systems, made up 
of a quadrangles scheme that represents a grid based property boundary oriented 
north-south and east-west using UTM or latitude/longitude coordinates (Naito et 
al 2001). 
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4.2.3. Providing rights through standardised agreements or permits/leases 
These are rights that have been developed in order to ease the burden of 
administering different mineral rights, permits, and leases and aimed at enabling 
good administrative capacity as all mineral development projects will be 
administered on the same set of rules and principles as opposed to ad-hoc mining 
contractual arrangements. However there is still a tendency of mining rights being 
complimented with applicable contractual obligations, which usually exhibit the 
following features: 
 
 The exact conditions of government‟s participation in a mining project is 
clearly illustrated, whether the state‟s involvement is direct or indirect, as 
practised in Botswana for all diamond development projects. 
 The terms applicable to a specific mineral investment are articulated in 
addition to the mineral legislative requirements.  This can be applied to 
mineral development projects where the commodity has a strategic value 
or use for industrialisation or the commodity may need special 
operational requirements to protect the environment from various 
negative impacts.  These may emanate from the exploitation of harmful 
radioactive particles from uranium and other mineral commodities. 
 The additional contractual obligation may be put in place aimed at 
complimenting the already existing mineral legislation or to merely 
stabilise fiscal and legislative requirements, as practised in Chile and 
Peru. 
(Naito et al, 2001) 
Practise shows that mineral hosting nations generally make mining contracts that 
have conditions of investment which are standardised and compulsory while 
stabilisation agreements have tended to vary and are usually optional.  
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4.3. Contracts and Conditions for Government Participation 
Mineral-hosting nations use numerous devices to enable their respective minerals 
sectors to contribute to the advancement of national development objectives.  The 
imposition of taxes on private mining companies is used to enable private entities 
to compensate the nation for the depletion of its non-renewable mineral resources.  
Taxes are also used for the compensation of the environmental problems 
emanating from a mining project (Otto and Cordes, 2002).  Mineral-hosting 
nations also use their administrative authority to direct the mining industry to 
contribute to Human Resource Development (HRD) and industrial diversification 
(Walker, 2004; Jourdan, 2010).  Numerous countries have created state mining 
entities with the mandate of exploring and mining on behalf of its citizens to meet 
several policy objectives, mainly ideologies, such as socialism or economic 
decolonization, which is an act of demonstrating permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources.  These state entities could also be formed to capture natural 
resource rents to increase capital intensiveness because of a weak private sector or 
to maximise government revenue and to promote national social objectives (Otto, 
1997; Otto and Cordes, 2002).  
 
When the state is both the regulator and operator of a mining company, it is 
essential that the state‟s participation be clearly defined, coupled with clear 
guidelines illustrating the exact size of the government‟s share, the state‟s 
contribution and the manner in which it will practise its authority over project 
decision making in a project that is comprised of both the state and a private 
entity.  Furthermore, a sensitive matter is the method adopted by the government 
in accumulating equity in a mining project.  Naito et al (2001) insisted that the 
common practise has been that the larger the government‟s share in a mining 
project, the lesser the government is willing to pay for it.  It is further stated that 
in such a case, the investor generally demands more fiscal concessions as some 
private mining companies may support being part of a project that has the state as 
a strategic partner, provided that the project will receive strategic preferential 
political support.  It is also argued that private investors are cautious of projects 
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where the state enjoys majority shareholding as this may compromise a 
technically skilled private investor‟s ability to guide mineral project economics. 
 
Another important issue in mining contracts with government participation is the 
timing of the negotiation and execution of government participation contracts.  
Naito et al (2001) indicated that the real concern is centred on whether or not the 
contract for state participation is fully negotiable as the observed tendency has 
been for host governments preferring to negotiate and effect participation 
contracts at the time an investor applies for a mining lease.  At this phase of a 
mining project the private investor has taken most of the risk associated with 
exploration activities and can confirm all the relevant information about a deposit 
and its development prospects.  This has been practiced in Papua New Guinea and 
in Botswana for diamonds.   
 
It was further argued by Naito et al (2001) that private investors prefer to 
complete all agreements pertaining to a mining development project involving the 
host nation early on during the exploration phase of the project so as to enable 
both parties to share the financial risk associated with financially intensive 
exploration activities.  He went on to illustrate that although private investors 
generally prefer to negotiate contracts with government participation at the 
beginning of the exploration phase, these negotiations are costly, especially for 
junior miners and those entities that have an interest in developing large deposits.  
It is also morally questionable for the state to commit public funds on highly risky 
financially intensive exploration activities. 
 
The state‟s involvement in mineral development projects partnering with the 
private sector requires strategic ownership and management models aimed at 
enabling the project to be beneficial for both parties.  The World Bank conducted 
a study in 2011 on the requirements, capacity and institutional obligations for a 
State Mining Enterprise (SME) to be successful.  The findings point to the 
following elements as being essential ingredients for a SME to be successful:  
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 A SME must have a strong governing body in the form of a Board of 
Directors with members who are independent and have sufficient 
experience and knowledge of the mining sector, including finance in 
mining both domestically and internationally.  The day-to-day 
management of the SME should be placed in the hands of experienced and 
motivated professional managers who know both the mining industry and 
the country‟s specific conditions. 
 The government should not consider a mining company as a mere revenue 
generator to cover budgetary deficits or other demands for money, skills or 
capital elsewhere in the national economy; however required 
reinvestments must be continuous where necessary.  Although annual 
profits from a state-owned mining company to the state is justified, these 
contributions must be appropriate compared to the size and profitability of 
the company. 
 There is a need, especially for politicians, to understand that it takes 10–15 
years to develop a mine and that the industry is a high risk sector.  If this 
understanding is lacking, hopes for quick results and short-term gains will 
be expected and when not realized this will be a disappointment to 
parliamentarians and their electorate.  
 Mining is also a highly capital intensive industry with high risks of failure 
for a new project.  There are a number of risks which include geological, 
mining, metallurgical, market and financial risks.  If the company does not 
have financial muscle to operate for a number of years without positive 
cash flow, it will fail regardless of whether the owner is a state or private 
investor. 
 A state company must be competitive whilst subjected to the same 
competitive conditions as its international peers.  Taxes, royalties and 
other fees should be levied as per the industry standards in the country.  
 Most state-controlled companies in the mining sector have been 100 
percent state owned with a few exceptions such as the Outokumpu 
Company, the capital of which was partially listed on the Helsinki stock 
exchange. “In the case of developing country companies, partial 
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privatizations have been carried out, with mostly positive results, such as 
in Indonesia.  For new state-owned enterprises it could be of interest to 
create a mixed capital type of company with a set timetable for gradual 
transfer of ownership from the state to private national entities and 
investors on a jointly agreed timetable” (World Bank, 2011) 
Naito et al (2001) shed more light on these elements by illustrating his 
interpretation from mineral hosting nations who enjoy state equity participation. 
These can be summarised as being a shift away from free carried equity by the 
state, entering into a standard agreement between the private investor and the state 
before significant exploration expenditure is incurred and the state should be a 
minority shareholder where the investor has an operating and marketing control 
over the project within reasonable limits (Naito et al, 2001). 
 
4.4.  Mineral Investment Contractual Obligations  
Sovereign states determine the contractual obligations for investments into their 
mineral sector.  In essence, these should include a clear illustration of the terms 
and conditions governing private investor‟s requirements to gain access to mineral 
resources in the form of mineral licensing regimes, permits or concessions which 
outline mining related fiscal terms, foreign exchange terms and mineral marketing 
obligations (Tsikata, 2004).  These mineral sector investment contracts are 
different to those which enable the state to be granted ownership in mineral 
development projects.  These are implemented to enable mineral development to 
be linked to broader national economic development compelling foreign investors 
to develop economic linkages within the national economy.  Numerous 
mechanisms are used to achieve the latter; however, Indonesia‟s Contract of Work 
(COW) mineral investment contractual arrangements stand out as the most 
effective.  The COW has proven to be successful mainly because it fully clarifies 
the provisions concerning the development, operating, monitoring and evaluation 
of a mineral development project from the early prospecting stages, through mine 
operation and closure.  Central to COW is the consultative process from the 
highest political office which enables the President of Indonesia, in co-operation 
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with the country‟s Investment Co-ordinating Board, and Parliament to approve all 
the fiscal and environmental contractual obligations for a mining project, which is 
approved both by the Minister of Mines and Energy and the appropriate 
representative from the private mining company.  The COW has progressive 
aspects which include the fact that it is comprehensive as it deals with all fiscal 
and legal areas and it only changes every few years from generation to generation 
and not from project to project.  Furthermore, it is entered into at the beginning of 
prospecting activity, thus providing early knowledge of the terms that will apply 
for the project (Barberis, 1998). 
 
The Indonesian COW model enforces firm time limits for each phase of a mineral 
development project, which impedes the flexibility of the duration of the mineral 
development project.  When compared to the Philippines‟ Mining Act of 1995, 
which introduced similar mineral investment contractual requirements as those 
imposed by Indonesia‟s COW, the big difference is that the Philippines‟ 1995 
Minerals Act offers private investors the opportunity to acquire full mineral rights 
ownership when private investors invest in large scale and financially intensive 
mineral resource exploration and development.  For the above to take place, 
investors need to enter into a mineral investment contract with the state of 
Philippines in the form of Financial or Technical Assistance Agreements 
(FTAAs).  The FTAAs contractual arrangement requires a minimum investment 
commitment of US$50 million for infrastructure and mine development put 
together by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for 
consideration by the President of Philippines (Barberis, 1998). 
 
Mineral-hosting nations have various instruments at their disposal to enable them 
to direct their respective mineral industries to contribute to economic 
development.  State equity participation in mineral development projects is one 
option while the development of standardised contract governing investment 
conditions is another option.  Other observed mineral development contractual 
arrangements include mineral fiscal and legislative arrangements aimed at 
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providing investors with mineral sector regulatory certainty for times when a 
mineral hosting nation experiences changes in political leadership, tax legislation 
and/or change in investment legislation.  Mineral investment stabilisation 
agreements simply provide assurance to investors that the known mineral law 
provisions will not change or be made more burdensome to investors during a 
mine‟s life cycle (Barberis, 1998). 
 
These stabilisation agreements are helpful and provide comfort against any 
potential changes in a mineral-hosting nation‟s licensing regime; for example, tax 
reform has been practiced in Latin America by Chile through its Foreign 
Investment Law of 1974 (DL 600).  Stabilisation agreements are used as overall 
contractual agreements for a number of sectors in the Chilean economy.  In 
practise, the stabilisation agreement is important in fiscal terms in that it offers 
foreign investors foreign exchange access and freedom, little restrictions imposed 
on exports for a period of 20 years for investment of at least US$50 million, and 
10 years with no minimum investment.  However, a total effective income tax rate 
of 42%, which is much higher than the Chilean effective tax rate, is imposed 
during the term of the stabilisation agreement (Barberis, 1998).  In Peru, 
stabilisation agreements have been offered to both domestic and foreign investors 
that require a minimum investment of US$2 million for a 10 year agreement and 
US$20 million in a new mining operation, or US$50 million in an expansion 
project for a 15 year agreement.  In the Peruvian model, the annual income tax 
rate comes into effect from inception of the stabilisation agreement with 
standardised and non-negotiable terms (Barberis, 1998). 
 
Although mineral-hosting nations grant mineral rights based on objective 
procedures and processes, the deciding factor is whether the investor is offering 
the mineral-hosting nation the most beneficial terms in return for the mineral 
rights.  This explains most mineral-hosting nation‟s requests of proof of financial 
and technical capacity from mineral rights applicants.  In fact, this requirement is 
usually in the mineral legislative framework.  However, the time required to 
36 
 
evaluate the financial and technical capabilities has tended to be cumbersome and 
has also been filled with corrupt practices.  This practise also discriminates against 
new start up mineral investment vehicles that are not highly capitalised but have 
adequate prospecting and business acumen.  In most cases, these types of 
investors are offered mineral rights when there are no highly capitalised investors 
competing for the same mineral rights or when the mineral- hosting nation‟s 
investment climate is not attractive to major investors.  The equitable treatment is 
that the opportunity should be given to any investor provided that they are willing 
to take on the associated risks as pursued by most Latin American countries most 
notably Chile, Peru, Bolivia, and Mexico.  The tendency with mineral endowed 
Latin American countries has been to grant mineral rights on a strictly first come, 
first served basis based on the notion that the mineral right holder has the freedom 
to explore, develop or even transfer his mineral rights to an entity that is best 
suited to develop the project further (Barberis, 1998). 
 
In fact, in order to encourage investment in exploration activities, these Latin 
American countries generally allow transferability of exploration and mining 
rights.  Such a practise has enabled these countries to enjoy the highest amount of 
Greenfield mineral development projects coupled with a continuous number of 
prospects in the development pipeline.  Furthermore, the mineral policy on the full 
transferability of title has contributed to the further investment and development 
of sustainable secondary markets in which exploration and mining titles are 
transferred at high costs.  This process has proven to be fair and decreases the 
time associated with the processing of exploration and mineral right applications 
substantially.  It is also noted that linking the fees paid by titleholders in an open 
title registry with the strict principle of first come, first served enables the 
titleholder‟s fees to pay for the title registry‟s system‟s maintenance costs.   
 
In conclusion sovereign nations have the right to accept and /or to deny investors 
into their domestic mineral economy.  In practise the areas available, how 
granting of exploration or mining rights takes place and by whom and the 
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consideration of the environment are the four factors used as criteria to grant 
permission to invest.  Granting permission to invest relies on the overall host 
nation‟s government, this includes all sectors of the economy that will be affected 
by the venture being satisfied with the investment proposal. 
 
Various methods are used in a mineral regulatory framework to articulate the host 
nation‟s mineral policy objectives.  In some cases certain regulatory devices have 
to cater for the uniqueness of a mineral development project.  MAs are mostly 
used in these unique cases especially when the mineral regulatory regime is 
outdated or no longer reflects contemporary political and economic interests.  The 
authority to grant and regulate mining rights should be clearly expressed.  This 
authority can either be delegated to a government unit or to the executive 
authority.  Clear legislated guidelines are essential when authority to grant mining 
rights is vested in the executive authority 
 
The competitive (tender process) and the free-entry system are generally the two 
mineral rights allocation methods commonly utilised internationally.  To grant 
access for mineral exploitation host nations can either, free-up known reserves, 
provide an open title-registry or provide mineral rights through standardised 
agreements or permits/leases. 
 
Mineral regulation is used to coerce the mining industry to compensate the host 
nation for the removal of its non-renewable resources by using a variety of 
instruments which include the imposition of taxes, requirements for mining 
entities to contribute to industrial diversification and the creation of state owned 
mining entities. In cases where the state both regulates and participates in the 
mining industry clear flawless legislated guidelines are required, which explain 
the exact size of the government‟s stake and how its shares are acquired coupled 
with its roles and responsibilities in mineral development projects where the state 
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partners with a private entity. In order for both parties to share the risk associated 
with a financially intensive mineral investment project, the state‟s role and 
responsibilities need to be finalised early during the exploration phase of the 
project and free equity by the state needs to be discouraged.  What is evident is 
that the SME‟s should be operated effectively as a fully-fledged entity that is 
aimed at making profit and also contributing to socio economic requirements. 
Profits generated by the SME should not only be used to fund state budgetary 
deficits. As a fully-fledged entity the SME should constantly maintain a strong 
balance sheet and be allowed to retain a portion of its earnings to fund its 
operational expenses and expansion.  
 
Host nations contractual obligations should clearly stipulate the terms and 
conditions for investment aimed at linking the mining industry with other sectors 
of the economy.  The Indonesian model, known as COW, seems to be effective as 
it clearly expresses the monitoring of the contractual obligations throughout the 
value chain as it outlines the requirements pertaining to the exploration phase, the 
mining phase and mine closure.  
 
Mining fiscal and legislative arrangements may be established solely to provide 
certainty, especially to reassure investors of no fiscal or regulatory changes if and 
when the political regime changes.  These agreements are designated as mineral 
investment stabilisation agreements. The requirement for proof of financial and 
technical capacity from mineral rights applicants is essential but can be seen to 
discriminate against new entrants.  This can be resolved by using the first come, 
first served method to enable new entrants to explore, develop or even transfer the 
mineral right to an entity that has the capacity to develop it further. Transferability 
of mineral rights is important in encouraging and in growing exploration activities 
which increase Greenfield projects and a number of future mining projects. 
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5. SECURITY OF TENURE 
 
This chapter aims to evaluate the manner in which both the host nations‟ and 
investors‟ concerns and interests can be balanced.  The chapter is focused on 
understanding how a host nation can guarantee security of tenure whilst it also 
maintains its political responsibility as the custodian of the nation‟s mineral 
wealth.  The chapter also attempts to define the different phases of a mineral 
resource project and aims to recommend a plausible process in the administering 
of the cancellation of tenure. 
 
Mineral resource exploitation is both technically and financially intensive.  
Investors‟ main concerns in relation to supporting a mineral resource development 
project are largely influenced by making sure that the mineral right attained will 
be sustained for the duration of the project.  Of special interest to prospective 
investors is that this right should not be interfered with by government authorities 
or other third parties that may be interested in the same ore body.  The mere fact 
that a mineral project is associated with significant investment prior to the 
investors receiving returns on investments promotes the notion amongst investors 
that the duration of the mineral right should be of an adequate timespan that will 
allow the investor to conduct all the necessary activities.  Tsikata (2004) 
advocated that mineral production rights should enable unhindered recovery of 
exploration and development costs while also guaranteeing investors a 
comfortable return on their investment.  The observed perception is that mineral-
hosting nations prefer to develop mineral policies and supporting legislations that 
will promote the sustainable exploitation of their mineral resource heritage with 
strict requirements for private investors to adhere to socio-economic development 
and environmental protection obligations (Pedro, 2007).   
 
The rate at which a mineral development project proceeds from the exploration 
phase to mineral development is largely influenced by the mineral-hosting 
government‟s policies as well as legislation and administrative capacity.  Mineral 
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legislation which imposes timeframes on a mineral project may impose the 
appropriate pressure on the project to enable it to meet its project target in the 
planned time.  On the other hand, this feature can also retard project economics 
and compel investors to secure ore bodies in mineral-hosting nations that have a 
mineral legislation that does not allow government to set mineral project 
development timeframes.  With this background, it is of strategic importance that 
both the interests of the investor and that of the host nation are adhered to (Naito 
et al, 2001; Tsikata, 2004).  The mineral right holder should independently 
develop the mineral resource development project while adhering to the 
regulatory requirements of that particular mineral-hosting nation.  These could 
include a requirement for the mining project to recruit its labour force from the 
communities proximate to the mining project and/or employ environmental 
protection measures in all aspects of the mineral resource development project 
(Naito et al, 2001). 
 
It is common practise that exploration rights are given for a short duration of time 
with a majority of exploration rights granted between one and three years  
(Tsikata, 2004).  Even decades ago when mines were small, the time period 
allowed for exploration was very short and this is still the case with the existence 
of large mining projects.  The latter can be explained to be due to the use of more 
modern and sophisticated exploration instruments which include geological 
surveys, tectonic and structural interpretation, airborne and ground geophysics, 
stream sediment and soil sampling, geochemistry, drilling and geological 
modelling.  These modern tools have proven to have the capacity to detect hidden 
and exposed ore bodies (Otto and Cordes, 2002). 
 
The granting of exploration rights has naturally being associated with an option of 
renewal of these rights provided the holder has adhered to the required regulatory 
obligations.  Various mechanisms can be imposed by the mineral hosting nations 
at the exploration right renewal phase which can include the holder being 
obligated to relinquish a certain percentage of the area covered by the old 
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exploration right.  This is done in order to enable the mineral-hosting nation to 
discourage the speculative holding of land that may be of interest to other 
investors (Otto and Cordes, 2002).  Furthermore, the mineral-hosting nation can 
impose structured rental fees.  These fees are designed to escalate the longer an 
area is held under an exploration licence.  Not all mineral laws offer an 
exploration licence holder automatic access to be granted a mining licence.  A 
criterion can be established by holders of exploration rights to be granted a mining 
right, especially where the exploration right holder has found a commercially 
exploitable deposit.  The final decision as to whether the criteria to be granted a 
mineral right is catered for can be decided by the courts through the application of 
both objective judgements based on facts, with the assistance of technical experts 
(Otto, 1997; Tsikata, 2004).   
 
Tsikata (2004) identified that one of the most concerning aspects regarding 
security of tenure is whether or not the holder has exclusive rights to the area 
concerned or the holder has to share the area with other entities.  This concern 
emanates from the fact that certain exploration rights, including the right to 
conduct aerial reconnaissance surveys, are difficult to make exclusive rights as 
compared to those that are associated with physical work on a particular property.  
He noted that it is easier to grant exclusive rights to an entity conducting physical 
work on land and even grant them exclusive rights to a specific mineral or to all 
minerals within that particular land.  The exploration right needs to clearly 
illustrate its perimeters, whether the exploration right offers access to all the 
minerals in that particular area or it is limited to specific minerals.  In most cases, 
it has proven to be less complicated when the exploration right is granted for all 
minerals and the holder of the right is given the right to negotiate the condition 
with third parties that may be interested in the minerals other than those that the 
holder is focused on.  In order to explain the different types of tenure that can be 
granted to a mineral development project, it is useful to explain the exploration 
and development of a medium to large-scale mine, as illustrated in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2: The Exploration and Development of a Medium to Large-scale Mine 
Source: Otto and Cordes (2002) 
 
 
Time         Size of area 
(years)   Stage      (maximum) 
 
0   1.  Idea      1,000,000km2 
  Literature search       
1     Selection of favourable areas 
  Initial field work 
 
 
2   2.  Reconnaissance     100,000 
      Regional geologic geochemical & 
3        Geophysical surveys 
4 
   3.  Target evaluation and discovery 
5      surface examinations    <10,000 
6      commence community consultation 
7      3D subsurface work    <1,000 
8      feasibility study(s) 
 
   4.  Development 
9      permitting (up 7 to 10yrs in developed nations) 
11      development and construction 
11      community relations/participation plan 
13 
   5.   Production/ Reclamation 
      10 to 30 years or more 
 
 
A mineral resource project can generally be explained in the following phases: 
namely, prospecting, exploration, construction and development, mining, and 
mine closure or reclamation.  The phases can be administered by a number of 
different rights, which is referred to as a multi licensing scheme, or by one single 
right, referred to as a single licensing scheme.  In other cases, the type and size of 
a mineral deposit can determine the type of mineral rights granted by the mineral-
hosting nation (Naito et al, 2001).  The different types of mineral rights tenure are 
ad hoc exploration tenure, open-ended or long duration exploration tenure, and 
extensions to defined exploration tenure. These are discussed below. 
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5.1. Ad hoc exploration tenure  
This approach enables the mineral-hosting nation to grant an exploration right on 
an ad hoc basis enabling the granter to be flexible in setting the time period for the 
exploration right.  Mineral regimes that utilise MAs are prone to using this ad hoc 
exploration tenure approach.  This approach is full of uncertainty as there are no 
predefined conditions in relation to the time period for the existence of the right.   
 
5.2. Open-ended or long duration exploration tenure   
This approach is associated with set-time duration for the exploration period.  In 
most cases, a period of ten or more years has been allowed.  Several mechanisms 
are utilised which include a defined amount of work which needs to be completed 
within a specific time period and the imposition of land rental or a land area 
relinquishment schedule.  The practical experience with this approach emanates 
from the Mining Act of Alberta, Canada, which allows an exploration permit to 
grant an exploration right for a ten year period.  Furthermore, the regulation goes 
further to state that if the rights holders do not satisfy statutory obligations, which 
include escalating minimum expenditure work requirements, the permit can be 
terminated. 
 
5.3. Extensions to defined exploration tenure 
This approach sets a standard base period whereby an extension or renewal may 
be applied for and will only be granted if the applicant meets the established 
criteria.  The standard base period may be illustrated within a mining code or 
through a model mineral agreement.  Another model used to effect this approach 
may be the automatic right to renewal to enable an applicant to be granted a 
prospecting licence or a small-scale exploration title.  At inception, the initial 
licence period is two years.  After this period, provided the holder has complied 
with all regulatory provisions of the licence, the Minister is expected to increase 
the licence term for another two years.  This method has been developed to 
maintain the role of the independent low budget prospector in the mineral-hosting 
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nations‟ exploration industry, usually associated with an area that is less than 200 
hectares. Another model worth mentioning is the Discretionary Extension (under a 
Mining Code or a Model agreement).  With this model, the holder is granted five 
year tenure.  Extension can be granted for another period and the holder needs to 
apply for this extension by submitting a comprehensive report illustrating the 
actual work that has already been completed coupled with the work recommended 
for the extension period.  The COW sets out the following four time-limits during 
the mineral project development phase. 
 General survey period   1.5 years from contract signature 
 Exploration period   3 years 
 Feasibility study period  1 year (extension possible) 
 Construction period   3 years (extension possible) 
 
 __________________________________________________________ 
 Total without extension  8.5 years 
(Naito et al (2001) 
 
5.4.  Continuity of tenure  
The financial intensity and high risk associated with exploration activities ensures 
that investors in exploration activities require a clear link between being granted 
an exploration license and being granted the right to mine the mineral resource 
found.  The reality is that the majority of mineral-hosting nations issue single 
mining licenses related to each phase of the mineral development project namely, 
of prospecting or exploration through to production and marketing (Otto, 1997).  
Assurances are offered in some form of binding agreement.  This is to ensure that 
the holder of exploration rights will be granted a corresponding mining right 
where the holder of the exploration right has the ultimate right to receive a mining 
right within his respective area of exploration without having to produce proof of 
the existence of a commercially viable mineral deposit or the entities financial or 
technical ability to exploit the ore body.  Instead the former exploration right 
holder who gets granted a mining right will be expected to pay a very high fee per 
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hectare of land being mined, this fee is much higher than the one paid during the 
exploration phase (Naito et al, 2001).  
 
Certain obligations are usually associated with the granting of a mining right. 
These can be summarised as an approved Socio-Economic Impact Assessment 
(SEIA), an Environmental Management Plan (EMP), and a Mining Works 
Programme (MWP) mainly as legislated obligations and the mining company‟s 
social right to operate.  In certain cases, the mining rights are transferable to 
enable owners of the mining right to be able to allocate these rights to an entity 
that has the optimum capability to develop the ore body.  However, some mineral- 
hosting jurisdictions do not strongly emphasise the link between holding an 
exploration right and receiving of mining right (Otto, 1997).  In these 
jurisdictions, such as the People‟s Republic of China (PRC) and India, investors 
can apply for a mining right within a designated exploration area provided the 
applicant of the mining right provides compulsory information such as feasibility 
studies, a mining plan and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) as proof that 
(i) the applicant has both the financial and technical capacity to develop the 
mineral project, (ii) an adequate environmental management programme will be in 
place, and (iii) the mining project will contribute towards socio-economic 
empowerment of communities proximate to its operations (Tsikata, 2004; Naito et 
al, 2001). 
 
Generally, investors in mining projects favour a regulatory regime that clearly 
demonstrates a passage from holding an exploration right to being issued with a 
mining right (Otto and Cordes, 2002).  There has been a general discomfort with 
mineral-hosting nations that leave the mining right granting process to the 
discretion of the Minister of mineral resources without the existence of a 
transparent objective process and adjudication procedures which can ultimately 
provide for recourse to international arbitration in the event of a dispute (Naito et 
al, 2001).  
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5.4.1. Maintenance of a mining licence  
For maintaining a license, there are normally fees that are required and these can 
be subdivided into annual fees based on the project‟s surface area, and the 
minimum expenditure requirements (Otto, 1997).  With the annual surface area 
fees model, the mineral right holder is expected to make regular periodic 
payments to the state, influenced by the size of the surface of the mining project.  
The periodic amount should be set so that the rate is fair to both the state and the 
investor and should be a fee that is indexed for inflation and devaluation so as not 
to make it economically meaningless.  To try and come up with a fair rate, 
Mexico, Mongolia, Indonesia and Madagascar have developed a mechanism 
which escalates the annual surface fee starting with a lower fee during the early 
years which grows to a high amount towards and during the later years (Naito et 
al, 2001). 
 
Common to mineral-hosting nations that boast good administrative capacity is the 
imposition of minimum expenditure requirements that increase over a period of 
time.  This is characterised with strong monitoring of the work of licence holders.  
This is an approach that is mostly favoured by investors as the annual fees based 
on the project‟s surface area is concerned with investment in value added 
geological information while the minimum expenditure requirements is simply a 
sunk costs of the business operation.  Naito et al (2001) argued that the annual fee 
model is objective and very easy to manage while ultimately providing an 
additional revenue stream to the mineral-hosting nation.  Furthermore, he noted 
that as a policy instrument, it also promotes the serious work on an area or its 
abandonment.  He also offered some insight into the challenges associated with 
the minimum expenditure requirements as a policy tool.  These have been 
identified as, for example, the fact that there is no single amount that is 
appropriate for all types of exploration projects and the setting of an appropriate 
amount for each project requires a qualitative judgement, which makes it difficult 
to treat all projects equally. Further, the enforcement of the requirement requires 
government resources, but provides no government revenues (Naito et al, 2001). 
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5.4.2. Cancellation of procedure 
The cancellation of tenure is a very sensitive issue and a highly contested process.  
As argued by Otto (1997), the process needs to be clear, transparent and objective 
and should be explained in full during the application of either an exploration or a 
mining right.  Tsikata (2004) explained that the grounds and processes to be 
followed in suspending or cancelling a mineral right should be articulated in the 
mineral legislation and the extent of transgression should be aligned to the area of 
the law that has been transgressed.  He went on  to explain the latter by noting that 
default in the performance of environmental obligations should be associated with 
the suspension of the environmental license, not the termination of the mineral 
right.  He also argued that the final decision to suspend or cancel should be 
preceded by a notice to the rights holder and sufficient opportunity to remedy the 
default. 
 
As discussed above, investors need to be informed of the process and steps to be 
taken along with punitive measures to be employed by the mineral-hosting nation 
prior to cancellation or suspending a mineral right.  Furthermore, aligning the 
cancellation process with international best practise is both attractive and 
comforting to investors.  This is so as to allow for arbitration of disputes 
pertaining to cancellation or planned cancellation to be conducted at an 
international level, such as utilising the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) or utilising fair legal processes through the use of a 
mineral-hosting nation‟s administrative and judicial tribunals (Naito et al (2001). 
 
It is clear from this chapter that an investor should be assured that the mineral 
right attained will be sustained for the duration of a project as a mineral project is 
associated with significant investment prior to receiving any returns.  It is 
therefore necessary for the host nation to develop a mineral regulatory regime that 
will promote the sustainable exploitation of their mineral resources.  However, it 
is of strategic importance that both the interest of the investor and that of the host 
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nation are satisfied.  This can be achieved by allowing the mineral right holder to 
develop the mineral resource independently whilst adhering to the prescribed 
regulatory requirements. 
 
Host nations impose a variety of requirements in the promotion of full, quick 
exploitation of the mineral resource.  However, it is critical for the investor to be 
assured by the host nation that the holder of the exploration right has the ultimate 
right to receive a mining right for the respective area of exploration. The 
exploration right should clearly indicate whether the right offers access to all the 
minerals in that particular area or is limited. It is less complicated when the 
exploration right is granted for all minerals.  Imposition of minimum fees that 
increase over time coupled with a strong monitoring of the work of license holder 
are mostly favoured by the investors, but this requires qualitative judgement as 
every project is unique.  
 
The procedure for the cancellation of a right should be transparent, objective and 
be explained in full at the time of applying.  Aligning the cancellation process 
with international best practise is preferred by investors and will go a long way in 
making the host nation‟s jurisdiction a preferred destination for investments. 
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6. PARTICIPATION OF NATIONALS   
 
This chapter investigates the evolution of the mineral industry local content 
requirements by host nations.  The African Mining Vision of 2009‟s perspective 
on local content is reviewed.  The different tools that can be used to empower 
locals are also discussed to assess their ability to contribute towards the 
development of those who reside close to mining operations. 
 
At its inception in the 1960s, mineral-host nations in the developing world 
regarded local participation in the mining industry as local equity participation in 
the form of nationalisation of mines.  State equity ownership or local businesses 
offered equity in the domestic industries, largely influenced by nationalistic 
ideology following the demise of colonialism.  The failure of this approach to 
benefit host nations led to the adoption of a more pragmatic approach.  This 
resulted in the exclusion of direct state participation and highlighted the 
importance of allowing locals to be offered the opportunity to gain access to 
equity ownership in the mining projects within its borders.  This meant that 
investors invested in a host nation knowing that a certain percentage of ownership 
had to be reserved for nationals of the host nation (Barberis, 1998). 
 
The incorporation of host nations‟ citizens in the mine project life cycle continues 
to be a prominent feature in modern mineral regulatory regimes and is also being 
incorporated in MAs (Otto and Cordes, 2002).  What is of significance to this 
section is the African Mining Vision of 2009 (the Vision).  The Vision promotes 
the localisation of the mining industry as an effort to enable the extractive 
industries to move beyond the promotion of equity ownership and to also focus on 
its contribution towards the growth and broader development objectives of host 
nations.  Emphasis is made towards the  creation of  knowledge-based economies 
and integrated African markets through the employment of linkages that could be 
down-stream into mineral beneficiation, and manufacturing  into mining capital 
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goods, consumables and services (upstream) or linkages into infrastructure (side 
stream) (ANC,  2012). 
 
The overall focus of the African Mining Vision 2009 is to promote the integration 
of the mining industry into the economies of the host nations through the 
development of important linkages and greater investment into geo-surveying 
(ANC, 2012).  As illustrated by Barberis (1998), integrating a mineral 
development project into the broader national economy changes the traditional 
perception of a mine being an isolated project but rather a mine is recognised as a 
broader economic development project.  Heller (2011) stressed the need for host 
nations to develop the appropriate instruments to coerce the private sector to offer 
several opportunities in the mining value chain to domestic public and private 
entities.  Moreover this will also establish domestic technical competence that will 
decrease the dependence on foreign entities while also having direct returns to the 
national fiscus with a long term strategic focus of developing competent local 
service providers.  This is the process that will also energise and contribute to the 
much required positive spill-overs from the mining sector to other sectors of the 
economy (Ndaba, 2010; UNECA, 2004). 
 
Host nations have the important responsibility to utilise the exploitation of their 
non-renewable mineral resource heritage to develop expertise and experience 
amongst its population using a variety of tools, which include the following, 
namely: 
 Quotas:  Through its regulatory function the host nation can coerce the 
mining industry to comply with a minimum percentage of all employment 
opportunities, contracts, equity ownership to be designated for local 
entities or experts. 
 Skills Development Programs:  The mining industry can be mandated 
with the creation of technical training programs and/or supporting locals to 
gain access to skills acquisition opportunities. 
 Public Private Sector Research and Development initiatives:  The 
mining industry partners with the state to develop much required skills to 
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enable the local training institutions to align their training with industry 
requirements through the promotion of industry aligned R&D initiatives. 
 Incentives to develop local suppliers:  The mining industry assists in 
supplier development initiatives to enable locals to be able to meet the 
procurement requirements of the domestic mining industry.  
 Promoting mineral beneficiation:  The mining industry partners with the 
state in the development of mining value addition initiatives to create 
downstream industries and a vibrant manufacturing industry linked to the 
domestic mining industry (UNECA, 2004). 
 
It is important to state that in this context, the term “locals” signifies those 
nationals of the host nation who are earmarked to benefit from mineral resource 
exploitation, regardless of an immediate connection to the actual locality where 
mineral resource development occurs.  There is a need for certain opportunities to 
be reserved for people residing within the mining jurisdictions in order to 
strengthen socio-economic and political stability, and local business capabilities 
(Ndaba, 2010).  It is also useful to note that localisation may be associated with 
some limitations and trade-offs as the utilisation of local labour and local 
suppliers in the provision of goods and services may lead to an upsurge in project 
costs or retard project economics.  These include additional mineral resource 
development project costs associated with having to train locals to enable them to 
be technically competent to be employed at the mine and to also contribute funds 
to the development of local suppliers.  The investment will be of good use to the 
mineral development project in the long-term as the investor will have a local 
talent pool to draw skills from to sustain the mining project and can also rely on 
well capacitated local suppliers for services and products, provided that the local 
talent and the service providers have not migrated to other mines. 
 
It is clear from this chapter that over the years, host nations have moved away 
from defining local content as local equity participation by the state 
(nationalisation of mines of the 1960‟s) to locals being offered equity.  This has 
also been recognised in the African Mining Vision of 2009.  This vision also 
emphasises the creation of knowledge based economies, the promotion of 
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integration of mining industry into economies of host nations through the 
development of linkages as well as the integration of mineral development 
projects into the broader national economy.  With all the variable tools that host 
nations have at their disposal, they have a responsibility to use mining in 
developing expertise and experience amongst their populace.  
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7. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION  
This chapter attempts to define the meaning of environmental management pertaining to 
the mining industry.  The chapter goes further to try to understand the different 
management tools that can be effective in managing the environment.  To achieve the 
latter, the chapter also discusses the different approaches employed by host nations in 
managing the environment that is affected by mining activities. 
 
Policy to ensure the protection of the environment from mining activities is a highly 
politicised issue which has gained importance in the twenty-first century (Bell and 
McGillivray, 2001).  UNECA (2004) noted that there is a need to offer environmental 
protection statutory and constitutional powers.  The associated government and 
governance support emanates from the importance that environmental management was 
given in the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED).  The latter was prompted by growing concerns in finding effective solutions 
to manage the adverse effects emanating from industrial activities that have contributed 
to deforestation, global warming, acid rain, Acid Mine Drainage (AMD), the continuous 
depletion of the ozone layer and the varying degrees of toxic waste (Bell and 
McGillivray, 2001).  The adequate management of the environment has become 
integrated into a mine‟s cost structure (Wise, 1995).  To understand the issues at hand, 
one needs to attempt to define the actual meaning of the environment, which is 
generally understood as our surroundings.  However, a specific meaning is that of the 
physical environment which encompasses space, land, air, wildlife and plants.  In actual 
fact, the environment is understood from an array of perspectives, which include the 
environmental perspectives, economic perspectives, social and cultural perspectives and 
the scientific perspectives (Bell and McGillivray, 2001) as discussed below: 
 Environmental perspectives:  This perspective focuses on the need to employ 
measures to guard the environment at all costs and where possible to extend this 
protection to safeguarding of human health.  The protection of the environment 
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is an overriding objective regardless of any other perspectives that can be proven 
by economists and scientists. 
 Economic perspectives:  This perspective is primarily concerned with the 
employment of costs-benefit analysis to assess the options to pursue economic 
projects versus the protection of the environment.  Economists point to the 
notion of including stakeholders to assess the associated benefits of a project that 
has a potential to yield much required economic outcomes such as employment 
and industrialisation in relation to not disturbing the physical environment. 
 Social and cultural perspectives:  This perspective is largely influenced by the 
need to establish and respect the socio-cultural relations that people may have 
with the physical environment; particularly to engage in collective negotiations 
with those who have social and cultural ties to particular surroundings so as to 
use their interpretations to all planning pertaining to a certain setting. 
 Scientific perspectives:  This is a natural science approach which promotes 
resolving environmental concerns through the employment of scientific 
techniques as an attempt to attain objective and scientifically proven factual 
information about the physical environment as opposed to relying on subjective 
environmental, economic, social and cultural judgements. 
(Bell and McGillivray, 2001). 
 
All these perspectives have an impact in the manner in which mining activities are 
executed as well as a direct impact on all aspects of the mining industry.  In an attempt 
to regulate the mining industry in a manner in which it will adhere to all four 
perspectives (environmental, economic, social and cultural and scientific) mining 
activities have to comply with mineral-host nations‟ specific environmental regulatory 
frameworks which should at least address the following elements:  
 Socio Economic Impact Assessment (SEIA). 
 Environmental Management Systems and Programmes (EMSP). 
 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIAs). 
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 Environmental Monitoring and Evaluation Programmes (EMEP). 
 Mine Site Rehabilitation (MSR).  
(UNECA,   2004) 
 
In the mining industry, there are seven topical areas that need to be considered relating 
to the potential that the industry has to damage the immediate physical environment.  
These are (i) the management of large-volumes of waste,  
(ii) planning and management of mine closures, (iii) dealing with environmental aspects 
of mining legacies, (iv) the actual process of managing the environment, (v) the 
intensity of energy use in mining activities, (vi) employing adequate mechanisms to 
effectively manage metals in the physical environment, and  
(vii) having a clear understanding of the actual mining activity impacts to biological 
diversity (MMSD, 2002).   
 
The EIA is a management tool which has proven to be effective in managing the 
environment in the mining industry largely because its development and implementation 
go beyond the management of the environment, but also considers and incorporates the 
socio-economic factors around mining operations.  However, there have been observed 
challenges with its implementation as a result of limited knowledge in obtaining 
baseline hydrological information, evaluating archaeological sites, forecasting for acid 
drainage or detecting important fauna and flora.  The adequate use of an EIA relies on 
the existence of an Environmental Management System (EMS) which should 
incorporate the management of the environment into a mining company‟s overall daily 
operational activities, culture, processes and procedures.  This approach will offer a 
mining company a well-constructed system to be applied, monitored and evaluated 
throughout the life cycle of a mineral development project (MMSD, 2002).  The EMS 
should be categorised into the following stages:   
 
 Total organizational commitment. 
 Environmental policy and procedure. 
 Socio-economic impact assessment. 
 Environmental impact assessment. 
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 Community engagement. 
 Setting the correct intentions and targets. 
 Developing an appropriate environmental management plan. 
 Recording all work and developing an easy to use environmental manual. 
 Developing appropriate working control and emergency procedures. 
 Training the organisation about the company‟s EMS. 
 Developing and implementing effective emissions and performance monitoring 
tools. 
 Continuously conducting environmental and compliance audits, and reviews. 
(MMSD, 2002).   
 
Generally, two approaches are employed by host nations in the management of the 
environment within the mining sector.  The sectorial approach is associated with 
offering the mining ministry of a host nation the authority of granting environmental 
licences, as well as the monitoring and evaluation of compliance with the EIA.  The 
other approach is the central approach, where environmental management is centralised 
to the environmental ministry with environmental legislation and its enforcement being 
applied commonly across all sectors of the economy (Naito et al, 2001).   
 
 
Table 3:  Environmental Statutes Affecting Mineral Operations in Selected Host 
Nations from Latin America, Asia and Africa Table 3 below clearly indicates that 
environmental law has become a political discipline in Latin America, Asia and Africa, 
as its enforcement has become entangled with a political office propelled by politically 
charged disputes.  Experience to date indicates the following future policy implications, 
namely: 
 
 Host nations are moving away from the reactive notion in solving environmental 
problems but rather developing the appropriate legislation and standards that 
mining companies need to comply with in relation to environmental protection. 
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 Mining companies are expected to continue developing innovative means to 
address mining-related environmental impacts and attempts to adopt more 
environmentally friendly production practises. 
 Environmental protection should be part and parcel of a mine‟s daily operations, 
with adequate planning to rehabilitate the mine site to an acceptable state after 
mining ceases. 
 The private sector is already showing various means of collaborating with other 
public entities and shares resources and expertise in the field of environmental 
management.  
 
Due to growing concern in finding effective solutions in managing the adverse effects 
on the environment emanating from mining and other industries, the EIA is a 
management tool that has proven to be effective in managing the environment in the 
mining sector.  The EIA relies on the existence of an EMS which should be 
incorporated in the daily operational activities of the mine.  In managing the 
environment, host nations use either the sectorial or the central approach depending on 
the general approach the nation has towards environmental management.  There does 
not seem to be a defined method of deciding on either methodology by host nations. 
(Bell and McGillivray, 2001). 
 
Table 3:  Environmental Statutes Affecting Mineral Operations in Selected Host 
Nations from Latin America, Asia and Africa   
 
(Naito.et al (2001). 
Region and 
Host Nation 
Environmental law 
Environmental 
administration for 
mining 
Inspection and 
monitoring agency 
Latin America 
Chile Decree 185of 
Ministry of Mining 
(air pollution), 
Decree 4 (1992) of 
Ministry of Health 
(air pollution in 
Metropolitan region); 
National 
Commission for the 
Environment 
(CONAMA) 
Ministry of Mining, 
Ministry of Health 
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Law Number 19 300 
(frame work for 
environmental 
legislation) 
Brazil National System for 
the Environment, 
Law No. 6.938 of 
August 31, 1981, 
Law 9.605 of 
February 12, 1996 
Ministry of 
Environment, 
National Council for 
the Environment 
(CONAMA) – 
Federal, State and 
Regional 
Environmental 
Agencies 
Ministry of Mines 
and Energy 
Asia 
China Environmental 
Protection Law; Law 
on the Prevention 
and Mitigation of 
Water Pollution; Law 
on the Prevention 
and Mitigation of Air 
Pollution; 
Regulations on the 
Control of Noise 
Pollution; 
Regulations on Land 
Reclamation; Interim 
Measures on the 
Collection of Fee for 
Excessive Release of 
Pollutants; Measures 
on Environmental 
Protection 
Management on 
Capital Construction 
Projects 
Ministry of 
Environment, 
Ministry of Land and 
Resources 
Ministry of Land 
and Resources 
India Environment 
(Protection) Act 
1986 and amendment 
1991 
Ministry of 
Environment and 
Forest 
Ministry of 
Environment and 
Forest 
Indonesia Law No. 23 of 1997 
concerning 
Environmental 
Management 
Directorate General 
of Mines 
Directorate General 
of Mines 
Africa 
Botswana Mines and Minerals Mines Department, Air Pollution 
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Act, 1999 (May 21, 
1999) 
Ministry of Minerals, 
Energy and Water 
Affairs 
Control Division, 
Mines Department, 
Ministry of 
Minerals, Energy 
and Water Affairs 
Ghana Mining and 
Environmental 
Guidelines 1994 
Environmental 
Protection Agency 
Environmental 
Protection Agency 
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8. FISCAL POLICY AND MINERAL TAXATION  
This chapter discusses fiscal policy and taxation in relation to the mining industry.  The 
different types of mineral taxes are investigated.  The chapter aims to understand a 
balanced and fair approach towards mineral taxation, an approach which will enable the 
state to collect sufficient revenue while also allowing investors to operate on profitable 
terms. 
 
The role of a host nation‟s fiscal policy is primarily centred on the process of using the 
nation state‟s budget to guide its economy.  Fiscal policy should clearly articulate the 
manner in which state revenue collection, in the form of taxes and its spending (public 
expenditure), should be conducted.  The actual mechanisms to be employed in altering 
government‟s taxation rates and expenditure to directly impact aggregate demand and 
the broader domestic economy should be considered.  These have an impact on the 
following macroeconomic variables in a national economy: 
 The sharing of income. 
 Aggregate demand and the rate of economic growth. 
 The arrangement of the distribution of resources by the public sector in relation 
to the private sector (Van Zyl et al 2009) 
 
Mineral-host nations‟ fiscal policy should illustrate how the mineral resource heritage 
will be treated to enable it to yield positive economic returns or rent for the host nation.  
Mineral resource rent can be described as the actual value of a mineral resource deposit, 
excluding all the costs of production and comprising of the minimum return to capital, 
needed to realise an investment return.  Mineral resource rent is influenced by the 
quality of the ore (ore grade), prices at a specific point in time as a result of the 
fluctuating nature of mineral resource prices, and the actual operational costs at the 
time.   
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To achieve mineral tax neutrality – an ideal tax system - it is advisable that mineral 
taxation should be employed in a manner that will ensure it does not modify pre-tax 
investment decisions.  This will require taxation to be imposed at the mineral rent 
availability stage excluding the taxation of expenditure associated with production 
(capital and labour) and operational inputs such as water, energy and explosives.  In 
practise, mineral resource taxation relies on unconfirmed payments from the mining 
houses, which are traditionally taxes imposed on profits or actual cash flow (Daniel, 
2002).  
 
The mineral taxation system designed must adhere to both the operational requirements 
of the mining industry and the expected benefits by the host nation, as the tax policy 
will have an impact on both the actual speed of development of a mineral resource and 
the host nation‟s perception of the mineral development project.  In order to merge 
interests that may vary at certain instances, Daniel (2002) proposed adherence to the 
following aspects in the development of a mineral taxation system: 
 Making adequate incentives for enterprises to explore and invest; and 
 Acquiring a rational share of returns over time for the host nation. 
In meeting these aims, these are the following supportive guiding principles: 
 The fiscal policy must be in line with global standards and be crafted similar to 
mineral-hosting nations with comparable geological heritage, political and 
economic conditions. 
 The host nation is in a position to increase taxes if they do not impact negatively 
on its investment climate  
(Daniel, 2002). 
 
The actual design of the system should bring about an equitable balance between the 
following reflections: 
1. Decrease risk to the private sector in that rent should be taxed only when it is 
realised and in relation to the projection of revenues. 
2. Explore means to propose and develop adequate fiscal stability agreements 
where applicable. 
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(Daniel, 2002). 
The distribution of mineral resource rents has become highly politicised and contested 
with heated disputes centred on who should be getting a bigger share of the revenue 
between the mining industry stakeholders.  These include the employees, communities 
residing next to mining operations, and central and local governments.  The private 
sector has to act strategically in balancing the requirements of all these stakeholders as 
when the balance is not managed appropriately, the end result may be riots by 
community members or even the central government imposing harsh penalties on the 
mineral development project (Ernst and Young, 2013).  It is the role of a host nation‟s 
mineral regulatory regime to illustrate the types of taxes to be imposed on the mining 
industry along with articulating the various incentives and deductions associated with a 
host nation‟s taxation regime in order to meet the varying interests from mining industry 
stakeholders.  As advocated by Otto & Cordes (2002) the three main categories of taxes 
that are levied on mineral enterprises are profit-based taxes, output-based taxes and 
input-based taxes. These are discussed below. 
 Profit-based taxation:  Relates to the inclusion of dividend taxes, income taxes 
and additional taxes levied on profit.  
 Output-based taxation:  This tax is also known as a royalty, which is primarily 
aligned to the sales value of a mine‟s production, for example a certain type of 
ad-volerm taxation.  Host nations utilise them as they are dependent on a mine‟s 
actual production, which in some quarters is argued to be forecasted easily, and 
also guaranteeing uninterrupted flows of revenue throughout a mine‟s life cycle.  
Furthermore, host nations prefer royalties as they are relatively much easier to 
manage, to collect, to calculate and to monitor and evaluate over a specific time 
period.  However, it has also been noted that they promote efficiency and 
neutrality in mineral development projects while also having an impact on the 
actual rates and levels of ore recovery, which negatively impacts project 
revenues.  This increases commercial risks and makes marginal deposits 
unattractive. 
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 Input-based taxation:  These taxes are primarily associated with taxes imposed 
on mining inputs required for the execution of a mineral development project.  
These taxes include withholding taxes - or what is termed as sales transaction - 
and import duties are levied on capital equipment and also imposed on labour 
and remuneration related tax payments.  These taxes have a direct impact on 
production costs especially during the early years of a mining project. This 
phase is associated with the importation of all the required capital equipment 
therefore having a negative impact on the internal rate of return calculations. 
 
A nation‟s fiscal policy is responsible for demonstrating the manner in which the state 
will collect revenue, the types of taxes used, and how state funds will be spent.  In 
relation to taxation the state also has specific sectoral taxation methods.  The mining 
sector mainly employs three types of taxes; these are profit-based taxes, output-based 
taxes and input-based taxes.  It is critical for the host nation‟s mineral regulatory regime 
to articulate the taxation tools utilised within its domestic mining sector and the various 
incentives available, which should be globally competitive.  Furthermore, the tax regime 
in place must adhere to operational requirements of the mining industry while 
simultaneously fulfilling the expectations of the mining industry stakeholders.   
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9. SOUTH AFRICA’S MINERAL REGULATORY REGIME   
This chapter discusses South Africa‟s current mineral regulatory regime.  It defines the 
role of the state in the South African mineral industry, and discusses the manner in 
which the South African government issues mineral rights, and the security of tenure in 
the South African mineral industry. It also assesses how the mineral regulatory regime 
enables South African nationals to participate in the domestic mining industry.  The 
chapter further illustrates how the law compels the mining industry to employ 
sustainable environmental management practises.  The chapter ends by unpacking South 
Africa‟s fiscal and mineral taxation regime. 
 
The political changes that were ushered in South Africa in 1994 made it necessary to 
prepare the mining industry for the challenges which continued to face all South 
Africans as the country approached the twenty-first century.  In this regard, in 
September 1995, the Mineral Policy Process Steering Committee (the Steering 
Committee) was formed, consisting of representatives from both the executive and 
legislative branches of Government, as well as business and organised labour.  The 
Steering Committee conducted an extensive consultative process to canvass stakeholder 
opinion for the preparation of a new minerals and mining policy for South Africa.  The 
product thereof became the fore runner to the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act (MPRDA) Act No. 28, 2002.  
 
This Act considers the mineral resources of South Africa as the common heritage of all 
the people of South Africa, with the State being the custodian thereof for the benefit of 
all South Africans.  Mining in South Africa is therefore regulated mainly by only one 
piece of legislation, the MPRDA as amended by Act No 49, 2008. Both statute and 
common law regulate the South African mineral industry, with the MPRDA being the 
main regulatory framework for the domestic mining industry.  It is well documented in 
the MPRDA that in instances where there is conflict between common law and the 
MPRDA, the latter will succeed.  It is also worth mentioning that the MPRDA does not 
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abolish common law as interpreting the MPRDA requires the consideration of the 
common law.  Under the MPRDA, the state is the custodian of South Africa‟s mineral 
resources and the regulation of the industry is conducted primarily from the national 
office, located in Pretoria, and the respective regional offices of the Department of 
Mineral Resources (DMR).  Other pieces of legislation, such as. The Precious Metals 
Act, 2005 and the Diamond Act, 1986 only regulate the mining products rather than the 
act of mining per se.  The major issues of the status of the mineral sector of South 
Africa are therefore defined by the MPRDA and are discussed below.  
 
9.1. Defining the Role of the State 
As the custodian of the nation‟s mineral resources, the State, acting through the Minister 
of Mineral Resources (the Minister) may grant, issue, refuse, control, administer, and 
manage any reconnaissance permit, exploration right and production right (MPRDA, 
2002).  
 
Currently the State does not fully participate in the exploitation of the mineral resources 
of the country further and no other agreements, in this regard are applicable in South 
Africa. This, in essence, stifles participation of new entrants into the sector since a “one 
size fits all” principle is engendered in the South African regulatory regime. It is worth 
noting that the South African government has investments in a number of mining 
ventures, which includes an equity investment in Alexcor Diamond Mining Company, 
with equity invested through the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) and the 
Public Investment Corporation (PIC).  Other state investments include the CEF Group 
of Companies which is state owned.  However, there are proposals for state intervention 
in the form of a discussion paper, the State Intervention in the Minerals Sector (SIMS 
report), (ANC, 2012) under discussion in the ruling party, the African National 
Congress (ANC).  The SIMS Report proposes a different scenario to the current regime 
which might influence the current status quo.  Such proposals are not included in this 
research paper as they are not government policy as yet nor are issues raised in the 
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Mineral and Petroleum Resources Amendment Bill (2013) included as they are not law 
as yet. 
 
9.2. South Africa’s mineral regulatory function  
As per the MPRDA, the Minister has the authority to issue, grant, refuse, and administer 
all rights.  The acquiring of rights is on a first come, first served basis which dictates 
that an application for prospecting right, mining right or mining permit has to be granted 
if there is no other application for the same right, for the matching mineral and territory 
The Minister is able to invite and to illustrate the procedure for the allocation of these 
rights.  Private entities are empowered to obtain a permit to conduct various activities 
which include reconnaissance, practical and technical cooperation, mining and 
retention.  Private entities have access to acquire prospecting, exploration and mining 
rights (MPRDA, 2002). 
 
A mining right should be granted exclusively to the holders of a prospecting or retention 
right.  Renewal of prospecting, exploration and mining right is exclusively guaranteed 
to holders of those rights.  However, the legislated renewal process needs to be followed 
to enable the Minister to renew those rights.  A limitation is imposed on a 
reconnaissance permit in that the holder of such a permit is not granted an exclusive 
right to be offered a prospecting or a mining right.  Access to mineral resources in South 
Africa, therefore, is through permits and rights.  The main principles underpinning the 
qualification criteria for an applicant to acquire such permits or rights are somewhat 
identical, namely, before any license or right is granted the applicant must: 
 Indicate that he or she has access to financial resources and has the technical 
ability to conduct the proposed work.  
 Indicate that the estimated expenditure is compatible with the proposed 
operations in relation to work to be done. 
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 Indicate the ability to comply with the relevant provisions of the Mine Health 
and Safety Act (MHSA), 1996.  
 Consult with interested and affected parties. 
 Show consideration to the environment and 
 Show, in the case of a mining right, how he or she will substantially and 
meaningfully expand opportunities for historically disadvantaged persons to 
enter the minerals sector, promote employment and advance the social and 
economic welfare of all South Africans and the Mining Charter as contemplated 
in Section 100 of the MPRDA. 
(MPRDA, 2002) 
Further to this, any person who intends to beneficiate any mineral mined in the Republic 
outside the Republic may only do so after a written notice and in consultation with the 
Minister (MPRDA, 2002). 
Any person who wishes to apply must lodge the application at the office of the Regional 
Manager in whose region the land is situated together with the prescribed non-
refundable application fee.  On acceptance of the application, the Regional Manager 
must forward the application to the Minister for consideration who will either grant or 
refuse it.  On refusal, the Minister must forward reasons to the applicant in writing 
within a prescribed period (MPRDA, 2002). 
 
Different minerals have several restrictions on the time offered for the exploitation of 
the mineral commodities, coupled with additional limitations on the number of renewals 
that can be granted.  Additional obligations are conferred on the rights holder and these 
include obligations to the labour force, mine closure rehabilitation and communities 
adjacent to the mining operations.  The most clearly legislated obligation is the notion 
around the right to enforce optimal exploitation of the mineral resources of the country 
to coerce those who are granted rights to use them within the time offered for a 
particular right.  The optimal exploitation is reliant on the development of mining, 
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prospecting, exploration and/or a production work programme that needs to be 
developed and adhered to throughout the life cycle of a particular right (MPRDA, 2002)   
 
Aside from the time periods agreed upon and which need to be adhered to by holders of 
particular rights, access to land needs to be carefully negotiated with the landowners and 
all lawful occupiers of that land, with only the entity that has been granted the mining 
right having the exclusive right to exploit mineral resources in that particular territory. 
The ceding, transferring, letting, alienating, disposing or holding by mortgage of a 
mining permit, mining, prospecting, exploration and production right requires 
permission from the Minister, which will only be granted based on a valid reason.  The 
entity receiving the right is required to prove that they have the capacity to meet all the 
legislated obligations associated with holding that particular right.  Failure to adhere to 
the MPRDA constitutes non-compliance, which is associated with the relevant penalty 
as outlined in the MPRDA.  Some other areas of compliance with regards to holding a 
particular right include: 
 An entity in possession of a prospecting right is granted the exclusive right to 
convert a legally valid prospecting right to a mining right. 
 In applying for a mining right the applicant needs to prove that they have the 
required capacity to engage in a mineral development project aligned to their 
Mining Work Program (MWP), Environmental Management Plan (EMP) and 
Social and Labour Plan (SLP) as well as the capacity to meet the legislated 
requirements of the Mine Health and Safety Act 29 of 1996. 
(MPRDA, 2002) 
 
Theoretically, there are no limitations on a foreign entity being granted mining rights. 
However, the holder of a mining right has to adhere to the Black Economic 
Empowerment (BEE) requirements of the country, which compel the holder of the right 
to set aside 26% of equity for Historically Disadvantaged South Africans (HDSAs).  
Furthermore, the holder of the right does not have an exclusive real right to the surface 
under which the minerals are found.  It is therefore the sole responsibility of the mining 
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rights holder to engage in negotiations with the landowner and to strike a negotiated 
settlement.  An agreement to be given access to the land by the landowner needs to be 
concluded before the commencement of prospecting operations.  Unresolved disputes 
usually lead to compensation being concluded through arbitration or a court relevant to 
the issue being contested (MPRDA, 2002).  
  
9.3. Security of Tenure 
Since all mineral rights are vested in the state, the state guarantees security of tenure for 
a prescribed period under certain conditions.  Any permit or right granted may not be 
ceded or disposed of without the written consent of the Minister, except in the case of 
change of a controlling interest in listed companies.  All permits and rights can be 
renewed as long as the application states the reasons, period for which the renewal is 
required, a report reflecting the previous progress achieved or results, the requirements 
of the approved environmental management programme and the rehabilitation to be 
completed with the estimated cost thereof (MPRDA, 2002). 
 
Under the MPRDA, no restrictions are placed on the ability to register a mortgage over 
the prospecting or mining right area.  However, a right holder cannot register any 
security over a prospecting or mining right that is currently in the registration process at 
the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Titles Registration Office.  The written consent of 
the Minister is required for the alienation, subletting, ceding, transferring, disposing or 
transferring of a prospecting or mining right except when the controlling interests in a 
listed company changes.  Ministerial consent is not required in the process of using 
prospecting or mineral rights as collateral to access a loan or when used to guarantee the 
funding or financing of a prospecting or mineral development project by a bank.  This is 
covered and described in the Bank Act 94 of 1990.  All uses of the mortgage of any 
right need to be lodged with the relevant registration at the Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Titles Registration Office (MPRDA, 2002). 
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9.4. Participation of Nationals 
The Social and Labour Plan (SLP) is a strategy aligned to the principles of the MPRDA.  
To guarantee real transformation, the MPRDA requires the submission of the SLP as a 
pre-requisite for the granting of mining or production rights.  The SLP requires 
applicants for mining and production rights to develop and implement comprehensive 
Human Resources Development Programmes, Mine Community Development Plan, 
Housing and Living Conditions Plan, Employment Equity Plan, and Downscaling and 
Retrenchment Management Plan (MPRDA, 2002) 
 
The programmes enshrined in the SLP are developed to promote employment and 
advancement of the social and economic welfare of all South Africans, whilst ensuring 
economic growth and socio economic development.  The management of downscaling 
and/or closure is aimed at minimising the impact of commodity cyclical volatility, 
economic turbulence and physical depletion of the mineral or production resources on 
individuals, regions and local economies (MPRDA, 2002).  
 
The Broad-Based Socio-Economic Empowerment Charter (Mining Charter) has been 
developed with the primary purpose of promoting unbiased access to South Africa‟s 
mineral assets to all South Africans and to increase opportunities for HDSAs in the 
South African mining industry.  The Mining Charter has been developed to be utilised 
by all those who affect and are affected by the mining industry, with the following 
elements being assessed by the regulator: 
 
 Ownership Element: HDSAs need to be offered the opportunity to practise 
effective ownership to enable the racial and gender composition which 
characterises the ownership of the mining industry to be transformed to reflect 
the demographics of the country. 
 Procurement and Enterprise Development:  The mining industry needs to 
open procurement opportunities to HDSAs entities by procuring at least 40% of 
capital goods from BEE companies by 2014, as well as ensure that 70% of 
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services and 50% consumables are procured from BEE companies.  Multi-
National Companies (MNC) who sell capital goods to the South African mining 
industry need to pay 0.5% of annual income made from local mining companies 
into a socio-economic development fund to be spent on community 
development. 
 Beneficiation:  Mining companies need to beneficiate minerals produced in 
South Africa and contribute to the industrialisation of the country in line with 
section 26 of the MPRDA.  Mining companies can offset the actual value of 
beneficiation achieved against the portion of its HDSA ownership obligations. 
 Employment Equity:  All mining companies need to work towards achieving a 
minimum of 40% HDSA demographic representation by 2014 at all 
management levels, which include executive management (Board of Directors), 
senior management (EXCO), core and critical skills, middle management and 
junior management. 
 Human Resource Development (HRD):  Mining companies need to invest a 
percentage of their annual payroll towards skills development programs, 
excluding the compulsory skills levy.  They should also offer support to South 
African based research and development activities aligned to innovation in 
exploration, mining, processing, technology efficiency, beneficiation, and 
environmental management and rehabilitation. 
 Mine Community Development:  Mining companies need to maintain their 
social license to operate by engaging in socio economic impact assessments of 
the areas in which their mines are planned and develop programs to mitigate the 
negative socio-economic and environmental impact that may emanate from their 
operations.  Mining companies need to collaborate with the local municipalities 
where Mining companies need to collaborate with the local municipalities where 
their operations occur and to choose Local Economic Development (LED) 
projects illustrated in municipalities‟ Integrated Development Plans (IDPs).  
Their contribution to community development projects should be comparable to 
the value of their mining project. 
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 Housing and Living Conditions: Mining companies need to ensure that their 
employees live in decent housing and living places, with particular emphasis on 
the conversion or upgrading of single sex hostels into family units by 2014.  
Mining companies should also ensure that there is only one person in every 
room in the mine‟s hostel accommodation and expedite the provision of home 
ownership opportunities for mine employees, working with organised labour. 
 Sustainable Development and Growth of the Mining Industry:  The 
stakeholders of the mining industry have committed to steering the domestic 
mining industry towards a sustainable growth and development trajectory by 
working together to ensure better management of the environment, improve the 
mining industry‟s health and safety performance and to improve skills 
development within the domestic mining industry. 
 
9.5. Environmental Protection 
The MPRDA has, through section 37, incorporated the principles as set out in the 
National Environmental Management Act (NEMA) to ensure that all phases, which 
include prospecting and mining, are conducted in accordance with generally accepted 
principles of Sustainable Development.  This has been done by integrating social, 
economic and environmental factors into the planning and implementation phases, so as 
to ensure exploitation of mineral resources serves present and future generations.  To 
achieve this, the applicant must assess and evaluate the impact that the activity will have 
on the environment and submit an environmental impact assessment report and an 
environmental management plan/programme (EMP).  An EMP is defined as a plan to 
manage and rehabilitate environmental impacts associated with prospecting or mining.  
Any person mining must comply with an approved Environmental Management 
Programme (EMPR).  The EMPR is prepared following an environmental impact 
assessment as prescribed in terms of the MPRDA and its Regulations.  Currently, 
decisions to approve (or refuse) EMPs or EMPRs are taken by the DMR.  As a result, 
there is a dual system for governing environmental impacts – one for mining and one 
for all other types of development activities that are regulated by the Department of 
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Environmental Affairs (DoE), which may need an environmental authorization in terms 
of NEMA regulations.   
In 2008, an agreement was concluded between the Minister of Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism and the Minister of Minerals and Energy regarding the transfer of the 
environmental authorisations (EIA) function in respect of mining activities under the 
MPRDA to the Department of Environmental Affairs and provincial environment 
departments under the National Environmental Management Act, 1998 (NEMA). 
According to this agreement, both Departments would effect the necessary legislative 
changes to the MPRDA and NEMA respectively and that the transfer of functions 
would then be effective 18 months from the date on which the last Amendment Act 
came into effect.  The National Environmental Management Amendment Act 62 of 
2008 was promulgated on 5 January 2009 and came into effect on 1 May 2009, making 
all the necessary changes to NEMA.  The Minerals and Petroleum Resource 
Development Amendment Act 49 of 2008 was promulgated on 19 April 2009 
(Department of Environmental Affairs Annual Report, 2012/13).  Environmental 
management is governed by various legislations, and an applicant for a prospecting or 
mining authorization must take into consideration the following legislations: 
9.5.1. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
 
Environmental management and the protection of natural resources are encompassed 
under Section 24 of Chapter 2 of the Bill of Rights.  Any planned development must 
prove that it takes this chapter into consideration.  In terms of the constitution, everyone 
has a right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being and to 
have the environment protected for the benefit of present and future generations through 
legislative and other measures. 
9.5.2. White Paper on Environmental Management 
 
The white paper on environmental policy is the government‟s policy governing 
environmental management with an aim to giving effect to constitutional rights.  The 
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vision is for a society that lives in harmony with the environment, considering that there 
are continuous interactions between society and the environment.  With regard to 
economic development, the policy states that there should always be a win-win situation 
so that the promotion of economic growth does not downgrade environmental gains. 
This is achieved through effective decision-making processes which focus on the 
sustainable use of natural resources.  The focus is on sustainable development based on 
integrated environmental management which addresses: 
 People‟s quality of life; 
 The integration of economic development, social justice and environmental 
sustainability; 
 More efficient use of energy resources; 
 Sustainable use of social, cultural and natural resources; and 
 Public participation in environmental governance. 
9.5.3. The National Environmental Management Act (Act 107 of 1998) 
 
Sustainable development is an important aspect that is emphasised within this Act.  The 
principles of NEMA (Chapter 1 (2) (1) (b)) serve as the framework within which 
environmental management and implementation must be formulated and developed to 
be socially, economically and ecologically sustainable.  In order for sustainable 
development to be reached, the integration of social, economic and environmental 
factors in the planning, implementation and evaluation of decisions is required.  It is 
argued that policy and legislation are fragmented between the spheres of government 
(CSIR Research Agenda, 2003: 4).  However, NEMA states that spheres of government 
must consult and support one another in order for environmental management to be 
functional elements of legislation.  This will enable the reduction of problems 
associated with the lack of integration of the environment in policy making.  
 
9.5.4. Environment Conservation Act (Act 73 of 1989) (ECA) 
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The ECA considers land development issues and sets frameworks by which the 
environment can be incorporated into planning policies as areas that need to be 
protected.  Sections 21, 22 and 26 within this Act make provision for environmental 
assessment and objectives.  The objectives are to:  
 Ensure that environmental effects of activities are taken into consideration 
before decisions are taken; 
 Promote sustainable development, thus achieving and maintaining an 
environment that is not harmful to people‟s health and well-being; and 
 Ensure that the identified activities which are undertaken do not have a 
substantial detrimental effect on the environment. 
 
9.5.5. The National Water Act (Act 36 of 1998) (NWA) 
 
The “National Water Act, 36 of 1998 (NWA) requires almost all water uses 
(abstraction, storage, waste disposal, discharge, removal of underground water and 
alteration to water courses) above certain thresholds to be licensed and registered.
 
Water uses for which licensing is required but which are not licensed and registered are 
illegal and may result in a fine or a directive to cease the specific operation or activity, 
decommission it and rehabilitate the area.  In practice, mines will be called upon to 
submit an integrated water use licence application together with an integrated water 
and waste management plan to the Department of Water Affairs (DWA) for 
authorisation.  Mines are also required to comply with the Regulations on Use of Water 
for Mining and Related Activities Aimed at the Protection of Water Resources 
promulgated under the NWA.” (Government Gazette No 191982, August 1998) 
 
9.5.6. National Environmental Management: Waste Act, 59 of 2008 
  
“Waste management activities are regulated by the National Environmental 
Management: Waste Act, 59 of 2008 (Waste Act).  What constitutes a waste 
management activity is determined by a list of activities published in terms of the Waste 
Act.  The Waste Act specifically excludes from its scope residue deposits and stockpiles 
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as defined in the MPRDA from its application and therefore the Waste Act's 
applicability to prospecting and mining activities is limited.  Residue deposits and 
stockpiles will be detailed in the relevant EMPR and these are otherwise strictly 
regulated by the MPRDA and its Regulations.
  
General waste generated at a 
prospecting or mine site must be treated and disposed of in accordance with the Waste 
Act.  Therefore, a holder of a prospecting or mining right may be required to comply 
with the general duties imposed upon holders of waste by the Waste Act.  These include 
obligations to avoid the generation of waste and where it cannot be avoided, to 
minimise the toxicity and amount of waste generated; reduce, re-use, recycle and 
recover waste; and to take all reasonable measures to ensure that waste is treated and 
disposed of in an environmentally sound manner and manage the waste in a manner 
which does not endanger health or the environment or cause a nuisance through noise, 
odour or visual impacts.” (Government Gazette No. 32000, March 2009) 
9.5.7. National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act, 39 of 2004, (AQA) 
 
The national law that currently governs air quality is the National Environmental 
Management: Air Quality Act, 39 of 2004 (AQA).  The main objective of the Act is to 
protect, restore and enhance the air quality in South Africa, and also to reduce risks to 
human health and prevent the degradation of air quality.  National ambient air quality 
standards have been established to act as a benchmark for measurement.  AQA requires 
that certain activities which impact on air quality be licensed.  These activities are 
contained in a list published in terms of AQA.  AQA also contains various air quality 
management measures including the declaration of priority areas and other measures to 
control dust, noise and offensive odours.  The Act describes various regulatory tools 
that should be developed to ensure the implementation and enforcement of air quality 
management plans.  These include: 
 Priority Areas, which are air pollution „hot spots‟; 
 Listed Activities, which are „problem‟ processes that require an Atmospheric 
Emission License; 
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 Controlled Emitters, which includes the setting of emission standards for 
„classes‟ of emitters, such as motor vehicles, incinerators; 
 Control of Noise; and 
 Control of Odours.  
 
9.5.8. The National Heritage Resources Act, 25 of 1999 (NHRA) 
  
In terms of section 39 (3) (b) (iii) of the MPRDA, there must be an assessment of 
impacts that mining related activities may have on national heritage resources.  The 
National Heritage Resources Act, 25 of 1999 (NHRA) aims to give effect to the 
constitutional protection afforded to heritage resources, which include movable and 
immovable objects of a historical, archaeological, paleontological “or astronomical 
interest.  Certain graves are afforded special protection and, amongst other things, it is 
an offence for any person to destroy damage, alter, exhume or remove, from its original 
position, any graves that are older than 60 years and situated outside of a formal 
cemetery administered by a local authority without a permit.  In addition, as indicated 
above, certain linear developments (such as the construction of pipelines) require 
compliance with section 38 of the NHRA which stipulates the minimum requirements for 
a heritage impact assessment (HIA). Importantly, if an EIA is required under any 
legislation, including mining legislation, then the results of any HIA must be submitted 
to the decision maker in the EIA process, who must take into account the comments of 
the Heritage Resources Agency when determining its application.” (Government 
Gazette No. 19974, 1999) 
9.5.9. National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act, 57 of 2003 
  
Section 48(1) of the National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act, 57 of 
2003 (NEMPAA) provides that "despite other legislation, no person may conduct 
commercial prospecting or mining activities in:  
 a special nature reserve, national park or nature reserve.  
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 in a protected environment without the written permission of the Minister and 
the Cabinet member responsible for minerals and energy affairs  or in a 
protected area, referred to in section 9(b), (c) or (d).” 
 
9.6. Fiscal Policy 
 
South Africa has a fiscal framework that is premised on a sustainable counter-cyclical 
methodology towards administering revenue and expenditure.  The government‟s focus 
is on the maintenance of social and economic programs in a manner that is not too 
costly for the state.  Taxation primarily comprises of varying levels of payment to 
government, which includes the national government that uses the South African 
Revenue Services (SARS) to collect taxes or local government.  Revenues collected by 
the national government emanate from income tax, value added tax (VAT), fuel duty 
and corporate tax, while revenues collected by the local government emanates from 
various grants from the national government and various rates collected by 
municipalities.  Mining taxable income is defined in relation to the general taxation 
principles with applicable changes specific to the minerals sector.  The taxation 
instruments used are illustrated below: 
 Royalties:  In 2008, South Africa introduced a new royalty system which forces 
every person that wins or recovers a mineral resource from within the Republic 
of South Africa to pay a royalty for the benefit of the National Revenue Fund in 
respect of the transfer of the mineral resource. (Government Gazette No. 31635; 
2008).  The royalty payable is determined by multiplying the gross sales of the 
extractor in respect of that mineral resource during the year of assessment by the 
percentage determined in accordance with a formula that allows for less royalty 
payment for a refined product.  The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty 
Act, which governs the royalty regime, further defines the refined and unrefined 
conditions of the major mineral resources mined in South Africa.  Of interest is 
that small businesses are exempted from paying royalties where, amongst others, 
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the extractor‟s expected imposed royalty does not exceed R100 000 
(Government Gazette No. 31635, 2008).  The rate employed changes based on 
the Earnings Before Interest and Taxation (EBIT) and actual gross sales.  The 
maximum rate for refined minerals is 5% and a rate of 7% is employed on 
unrefined minerals. 
 Corporate Income Tax:  28% is the standard tax rate with a 10% Secondary 
Tax on Companies (STC) charged for mining companies. 
 Withholding Taxes (WHT):  Plans are being developed to create a WHT at a 
rate of 10% which may replace the STC. 
 Capex Expensing:  Mining companies can be given an upfront deduction on all 
the capital expenditure undertaken.  The deduction is only implemented when 
the mining company has reached production stage which is also subjected to 
adequate mining taxable income.  If the company carries on trading they can 
carry forward all assessed losses.    
With respect to gold mining companies, a specific taxation formula is used which 
enables companies that are earning taxable income derived exclusively from gold 
mining activities to be taxed on a gold formula basis., The formula which determines 
the tax rate is illustrated and explained below: 
 “The gold industry tax formula: Y= a-(ab/x),  
 Y= the tax rate to be determined.  
 a= the marginal tax rate.  
 b= the portion of tax-free revenue and  
 x= the ratio of taxable income total income (these are the amounts obtained 
from gold mining before any excess mining capital regained before the set 
off any considered loss or deduction which associated with gold mining from 
the mine concerned.”  (van Blerck, 1990). 
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There are also a number of ring fencing provisions which apply exclusively to mining, 
for example, prospecting expenditure incurred outside a mining lease area may be 
claimable against mining income. 
 
Withstanding the above, there could be fine tuning of policy as the Minister of Finance 
has set up a commission headed by Judge Dennis Davis that is currently evaluating the 
current tax system against the internationally accepted standards, principles and 
practices.  The committee is advisory in nature and is not expected to overhaul the 
current tax regime but will ensure that South Africa‟s tax regime keeps up with the ever 
changing tax environment. 
 
In conclusion of this section the different themes are concluded below: 
 The role of the State 
The State is the custodian of mineral rights and the relevant Minister administers policy 
implementation. Currently the State does not participate in full in the exploitation of the 
mineral resources of the country. Further, no other agreements, in this regard are 
applicable in South Africa.  The South African government has investments in a number 
of mining ventures which include an equity investment in Alexcor Diamond Mining 
Company and equity invested through the IDC and the PIC.  Other state investments 
include the CEF Group of Companies which is state owned.  However, there are recent 
proposals in the form of a discussion paper, the SIMS Report 2012, under continuous 
discussions in the ANC. The SIMS Report might influence the current status quo. Such 
proposals are not included in this research paper as they are not government policy as 
yet.  
 
Both statute and common law regulate the South African mineral industry with the 
Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (MPRDA) being the 
main regulatory framework for the domestic mining industry. In instances where there 
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is conflict between common law and the MPRDA, the latter will prevail. Moreover the 
MPRDA does not abolish common law as interpreting the MPRDA requires the 
consideration of the common law. Under the MPRDA the regulation of the industry is 
conducted primarily from the national office located in Pretoria and the respective 
regional offices of the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR). 
 Access to Mineral Resources 
The Minister has the authority to issue, grant, refuse and administer all these rights.  The 
acquiring of these rights is on a first come, first served basis which dictates that an 
application for prospecting right, mining right or mining permit has to be granted if 
there is no other application for the same right, for the matching mineral and territory. 
This is coupled with the Minister being able to illustrate the procedure for the allocation 
of these rights.  Private entities are empowered to obtain a permit to conduct various 
activities which include reconnaissance, practical and technical cooperation, mining and 
retention. Private entities have access to acquire prospecting, exploration and mining 
rights. A mining right should be granted exclusively to the holders of a prospecting or 
retention right. Renewal of prospecting, exploration and mining right is exclusively 
guaranteed to holders of those rights. A limitation is imposed on a reconnaissance 
permit in that the holder of such a permit is not granted an exclusive right to be offered 
a  prospecting or a mining right and cannot therefore be automatically engaged in 
prospecting or mining activities.   
 
Further, “any person who intends to beneficiate any mineral mined in the Republic 
outside the Republic may only do so after written notice and in consultation with the 
Minister.” (MPRDA, 2002) 
 
In applying for a mining right the applicant needs to prove that they have the required 
capacity to engage in a mineral development project aligned to their Mining Work 
Program (MWP), Environmental Management Plan (EMP), Social and Labour Plan 
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(SLP) and the capacity to meet the legislated requirements of the Mine Health and 
Safety Act 29 of 1996. 
 
Theoretically there are no limitations on a foreign entity being granted mining rights, 
however, any holder of a mining right has to adhere to the Broad Based Socio-
Economic Empowerment Charter (Mining Charter) requirements of the country which 
compels the holder of the right to set aside 26% of equity to Historically Disadvantaged 
South Africans (HDSA‟s).  Furthermore the holder of the right does not have an 
exclusive real right on the surface in which the minerals are found.  It is encumbered to 
the mining rights holder to engage in negotiations with the landowner and to strike a 
negotiated settlement.  Agreement to be given access to the land by the landowner needs 
to be concluded before the commencement of prospecting operations. Ministerial 
approval is requested for the use of the land for activities that are not covered by the 
MPRDA.  The Minister may investigate any activity on the land which is deemed not to 
be covered by the right concerned at the time.  If a party is found guilty a rectification 
notice is served and implemented which also leads to the DMR conducting a 
comprehensive investigation between the rights holder and the landowner.  An 
unresolved dispute usually leads to a compensation being concluded through arbitration 
or a court relevant to the issue contested Expropriation is only recommended by the 
DMR to the Minister only when it is deemed that the process will fulfil the MPRDA 
objectives.  The MPRDA clearly articulates that no mineral rights will be given over 
protected areas unless permission is granted by the Minister. 
 Security of tenure 
Since all mineral rights are vested in the state, the state guarantees security of tenure for 
a prescribed period under certain conditions. Any permit or right granted may not be 
ceded or disposed of without the written consent of the Minister, except in the case of 
change of a controlling interest in listed companies. All permits and rights can be 
renewed as long as the application states the reasons, period for which the renewal is 
required, be accompanied by a report reflecting the previous progress achieved or 
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results, the requirements of the approved environmental management programme and 
the rehabilitation to be completed and the estimated cost thereof. 
 Participation of Nationals 
This is addressed mainly through the seven pillars of the Mining Charter and the Social 
and Labour Plans. The Social and Labour Plan (SLP) is a strategy aligned to the 
principles of the MPRDA to guarantee real transformation. The SLP requires applicants 
for mining and production rights to develop and implement comprehensive Human 
Resources Development (HRD) Programmes, Mine Community Development Plan, 
Housing and Living Conditions Plan, Employment Equity Plan, and Downscaling and 
Retrenchment Management Plan. 
 
The Broad-Based Socio-Economic (Mining) Charter has been developed with the 
primary purpose of promoting unbiased access to South Africa‟s mineral assets to all 
South African‟s but with emphasis to HDSA‟s.  The Codes of Good Practise for the 
Mining Industry have been developed to be utilised by all those who affect and are 
affected by the Mining industry with achievements of its elements being assessed by the 
regulator.  
 
Further the mining companies need to maintain their social license to operate by 
engaging in socio economic impact assessment of the areas in which their mines are 
planned and develop programs to mitigate the negative socio-economic and 
environmental impact that may emanate from their operations. In this regard mining 
companies need to collaborate with the local municipalities where their operations occur 
and to choose Local Economic Development (LED) projects illustrated in municipalities 
Integrated Development Plans (IDP‟s).  Their contribution to community development 
projects should be comparable to value of their mining project. 
 
Mining companies need to also to beneficiate their mineral produced and contribute to 
the industrialisation of the country in line with section 26 of the MPRDA. Mining 
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companies can offset the actual value of beneficiation achieved against the ratio of its 
HDSA ownership obligations which should not exceed 11%. 
 Environmental protection 
All environmental issues are subject to the NEMA which is administered by the DEA. 
The MPRDA has, through section 37, incorporated the principles as set out in the 
NEMA to ensure that prospecting and mining must be conducted in accordance with 
generally accepted principles of Sustainable Development by integrating social, 
economic and environmental factors into the planning and implementation phases, in 
order to ensure that exploitation of mineral resources serves present and future 
generations. In 2008 an agreement was concluded between the Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism and the Minister of Minerals and Energy (as they 
then were) regarding the transfer of the environmental authorizations (EIA) function in 
respect of mining activities under the MPRDA to the Department of Environmental 
Affairs and provincial environment departments under the National Environmental 
Management Act, 1998 (NEMA). According to this agreement, both Departments 
would effect the necessary legislative changes to the MPRDA and NEMA respectively, 
and that the transfer of function would then be effective 18 months from the date on 
which the last amendment act came into effect. The National Environmental 
Management Amendment Act 62 of 2008 was promulgated on the 5
th
 January 2009, and 
came into effect on the 1
st
 May 2009, making all the necessary changes to NEMA. The 
Minerals and Petroleum Resource Development Amendment Act 49 of 2008 was 
promulgated on 19 April 2009. 
 Fiscal policy and Taxation 
South Africa has a fiscal framework that is premised on a sustainable countercyclical 
methodology towards administering revenue and expenditure which is mainly governed 
by the Tax Act. The mining taxable income is determined in accordance with general 
tax principles but with modifications such as the capital redemption deduction in respect 
of mining capital expenditure, ring fencing provisions, the gold formula for gold mining 
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taxation and prospecting expenditure incurred outside the mining lease area may be 
claimable against mining income. 
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10. RESULTS OF THE SURVEY CONDUCTED 
 
A survey was conducted in a form of a questionnaire (Appendix I) which was followed 
up by one on one discussion with some of the participants.  Results of the survey are 
annexed as Appendix II.  The majority of the surveyed respondents (90%) were at 
senior management/executive level in their organisations, 60% of who were active in 
mining, 10% in exploration and 30% were consultants in the mining sector.  To avoid 
getting a government perspective on the survey, no government or regulator was 
involved in the survey as all participants were from listed private companies (30%), or 
non-listed private companies (70%).  The majority of the respondents (40%) were in the 
employment of large companies employing more than 2 000 people, the remaining 60% 
of the respondents were well spread from smaller organisations.  
 
10.1. Defining the Role of the State 
A somewhat confusing picture emerged under this topic, possibly indicating the 
confused state the country is presently in regarding this emotive topic.  The respondents 
were divided almost in half on whether the State should be the only custodian of 
mineral rights, with 50% agreeing, 40% disagreeing and 10% being neutral.  The 
respondents agreed that the state should enforce mandatory joint venturing but not with 
the State Owned Entities (SOE) as the only way to access mineral deposits.  The 
majority of participants (80%) agreed that the state should have equity in the mineral 
sector, and that all SOEs should not be privatised (60%) but should be treated in the 
same manner as any other mining rights holder under the law and compete equally with 
the private companies.  A small majority of respondents at 40% agreed that state 
enterprises should have preferential rights to certain minerals or areas and that the state 
could sign mining agreements with each company to allow for individual company‟s 
flexibility whilst it operates in the mining sector through a mining enterprise. 
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10.2. Access to Mineral Rights by Companies 
On the granting of rights, all respondents agree that there should be a mining code/law 
and regulations as the government‟s principal policy vehicle regarding exploitation of 
the country‟s natural resources.  The code should give support to national priorities, 
give clear guidelines on rehabilitation and BEE, which should be broad-based, ensure 
that the state and communities benefit, ban and limit exports of raw materials and 
provide support for beneficiation activities, promote SMME development, and 
incentives for beneficiation, and foster competitive beneficiation with mining having 
preferential access to infrastructure.  The majority also agree that the authority of 
granting rights should rest with the implementing executive authority, for example the 
DMR, who should maintain an open registry and grant rights on a first come, first 
served basis, with no discretionary powers.  The executive authority should allow for an 
open tender process for available rights which will include rights that would have been 
relinquished if not used.  Transfer of prospecting rights to third parties should be 
allowed.  The majority of respondents also agree that financial information should be 
submitted when applying, though they agree that this practise does discriminate against 
junior mining companies and HDSA companies. 
 
10.3. Security of Tenure 
The majority of the respondents believe that 3 years is a sufficient period within which 
to carry prospecting before applying for renewal and they would prefer an automatic 
right to mine what is discovered during the exploration phase subject to compliance 
with applicable legislation.  The main requirement sighted in this regard is an approved 
EIA/rehabilitation plan.  Regarding the treatment of the mining rights of coexisting 
minerals, the respondents are divided on whether each mineral should be treated 
separately or not.  They agreed that there should be fees payable for a right and they 
should be escalated during exploration and mining.  On the cancellation of rights, the 
respondents suggest that there should be clear guidelines, cancellation criteria should 
not be flexible and must be fair and be open to arbitration. 
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10.4. Participation of Nationals 
In the 1998 Minerals and Mining Policy of South Africa, a document also known as the 
White Paper for the South African Minerals Industry, it is reflected that in terms of the 
Constitution, the State is bound to take legislative and other measures to enable the 
citizens to gain access to rights in land on an equitable basis.  In addition, it empowers 
the State to bring about land rights (including mineral rights) and other related reforms 
to redress the results of past racial discrimination.  In line with this statement, all 
respondents affirmed this policy direction.  The respondents agree that nationals of the 
country in which  mining takes place, who can be trained, should be given relevant 
skills that can be used at the mines, and entrepreneurs should be developed amongst 
them, but not „tenderpreneurs‟.  In relation to the development of the infrastructure in 
the areas where mining takes place, the respondents felt that this is the responsibility of 
government; however, the mining companies should contribute and develop a symbiotic 
relationship with the communities.  The rights of the locals should be respected but not 
at the expense of others.  One of the respondents suggested that government should 
consider educating locals about their rights and the implication thereof.  There are a 
number of suggestions regarding the HDSAs; namely: 
 HDSAs should strive to be operational, work hard and not expect hand-outs. 
 Shares should be reserved for HDSAs. 
 HDSAs should be allowed to develop their enterprises. 
 „Once empowered always empowered‟ notion should be applied. 
 Community trusts should be established for each mining area. 
 Empowerment laws that have a negative effect on empowerment should be 
revised. 
 Apprenticeship programs be developed for the locals to offer the relevant skills 
and 
 Encourage locals to be able to be involved in mineral beneficiation/value add 
where possible.  
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90% of the respondents agree that all of the above should be linked to time, for example 
within the first year of mining 30% of employable youth in the area should have been 
absorbed into the apprenticeship scheme of mines operating in the area.  
 
10.5. Environmental Protection  
The White Paper, 1998, recognised the Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism as its lead agent for the role of environmental management, and the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry as lead agent for national water resources.  
However, the majority of respondents believe that only one ministry should be 
responsible for both mining and environmental issues pertaining to mining, with no 
separation of the mineral licensing process from the environmental permitting regime.  
However, there is an understanding that where there is separation of these processes, 
mineral licensing should be granted first and the environmental considerations should 
be simultaneously, not in a piecemeal manner.  All are in agreement that there should be 
financial guarantees in a form of a trust fund for environmental liability post mining, 
and the contribution to such a fund should be done annually and not once off, with the 
funds being maintained by private banks or the state.  At the end of the operations, the 
funds should either, be refunded back to the companies, be used for community 
development or be kept either by an agency or state for future rehabilitation.  Several 
recommendations emerged regarding how environmental obligations should be treated 
in taxation:  either they should not be linked to tax, be tax deductible, not taxed at all or 
10-15% of revenue be taxed for rehabilitation.  All participants were against self-
policing as an option as far as environmental issues are concerned, as they feared that 
self- policing would be open to abuse. 
 
10.6. Fiscal Policy and Mineral Taxation  
Participants would prefer operating in a mining environment where there is profit- based 
taxation and not output-based tax and/or input-based tax. They also agreed that there 
should be a specified tax holiday. 
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Most indicated that the MPRDA is not an impediment though it has some ambiguities 
that need to be corrected.  There is a feeling that new entrants of HDSAs are being 
blocked in preference of existing HDSAs in licensing. Reasons put forward as the cause 
of this uncertainty in the South African mineral industry are: uncertainty in the 
legislation, no clear permitting system, never-ending debates on nationalisation, length 
of time spent before licenses are approved, labour unrests, expected carbon tax, 
infrastructure(rail) collapse, wage inflation, inconsistency in applying the law, 
multinationals negative about transformation, and speculators.  All agreed that the 
intentions of the SLP are noble.  However, in practice little is happening, indicating 
frustrations in working with municipalities and traditional communities. The SLP is not 
specific regarding the type of investment expected and there is too much discretional 
hence different interpretations by DMR officials.  A suggestion put forward in this 
regard is that the DMR should look at introducing industry developmental projects. 
 
The reasons put forward by participants for the lack of appetite for beneficiation in 
South Africa are as follows: a lack of commitment; lack of innovation; huge capex 
outlay needed; unproductive labour in South Africa; the high returns on beneficiated 
products results in multinationals beneficiating abroad, where they pay less tax; lack of 
infrastructure; high electricity costs; and lack of skills base. 
 
When asked what else should be done to ensure that all stakeholders benefit from the 
mineral endowment of South Africa, participants indicated that there should be a 
proactive engagement by the DMR; compliance should be enforced especially on the 
SLP; free enterprise with set benefits for example 10% going to community trusts based 
on positive cash flow, not profit, should be encouraged; enrichment of individuals 
should be discouraged; community trusts should be encouraged to play a role as BEE 
companies; state ownership should be encouraged; Share Option Schemes should be 
encouraged, and the “once empowered always empowered” notion should be 
introduced. 
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Table 4:  Conclusions and Recommendations for South Africa’s Mineral Regulatory Regime  
DEFINE THE ROLE OF THE STATE 
International best practise MPRDA 2002 MPRDA Amendment Bill 2014 Survey Results 
The state‟s overall responsibility is 
to protect the interests of its 
citizens.  The state is enshrined 
with the important responsibility of 
utilising its mineral resources for 
the empowerment of its citizens.  It 
should employ the correct 
regulatory instruments to utilise its 
mineral wealth for the 
empowerment of its people.  It can 
achieve this through adequate 
mineral regulation and /or direct 
participation through ownership in 
its domestic mineral industry by 
using any of the following five 
The State is the custodian of 
mineral rights and the relevant 
Minister administers policy 
implementation. Currently the 
State does not participate in 
full in the exploitation of the 
mineral resources of the 
country. No other agreements, 
in this regard are applicable in 
South Africa. However, there 
have been proposals in the 
form of a discussion paper, the 
State intervention in the 
minerals sector (SIMS Report 
2012) under discussions in the 
The MPRDA is being amended in 
order to review, relook and fix 
ambiguities that are in the 
MPRDA guided primarily by the 
recent court judgements.  The 
amendments allow the Minister to 
govern various elements of the 
mineral regulation framework, 
establish timeframes and the 
associated policies. There has been 
no change on the custodianship of 
the mineral rights as they still 
remain held by the state.  
 
A somewhat confusing 
picture emerged under 
this topic. This 
probably indicates the 
confused state the 
country is presently in 
regarding this emotive 
topic.  The respondents 
were divided almost in 
half on whether the 
State should be the 
only custodian of 
mineral rights, with 
50% agreeing, 40% 
disagreeing and 10% 
being neutral.  The 
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forms of ownership, these are; 
compulsory joint venturing, 
compulsory contracting or 
participation, preferential 
competition, non-preferential 
competition and privatisation. 
The type of mineral ownership 
adopted should be aligned to other 
national policies to achieve policy 
coherence across the various 
sectors of the economy. Policy 
harmonisation is important as the 
mining sector impacts other sectors 
of the economy, as it is not a stand-
alone sector as it is usually 
perceived. 
ruling party, the African 
National Congress. The SIMS 
Report is proposing a different 
scenario to the current regime 
which might influence the 
current status quo. Such 
proposals are not included in 
this research paper as they are 
not government policy as yet. 
Both statute and common law 
regulate the South African 
mineral industry with the 
Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources Development Act 
28 of 2002 (MPRDA) being 
the main regulatory framework 
for the domestic mining 
industry. It is well documented 
in the MPRDA that in 
instances where there‟s conflict 
respondents agreed that 
the state should enforce 
mandatory joint 
venturing but not with 
the State Owned 
Entities (SOE) as the 
only way to access 
mineral deposits.  The 
majority of participants 
(80%) agreed that the 
state should have 
equity in the mineral 
sector, all SOE‟s 
should not be 
privatised (60%) but 
should be treated in the 
same manner as any 
other mining rights 
holders under the law 
and compete equally 
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between common law and the 
MPRDA, the latter will prevail. 
It is also worth mentioning that 
the MPRDA does not abolish 
common law as interpreting the 
MPRDA requires the 
consideration of the common 
law. Under the MPRDA the 
regulation of the industry is 
conducted primarily from the 
national office located in 
Pretoria and the respective 
regional offices of the 
Department of Mineral 
Resources (DMR)  
 
with the private 
companies.  A small 
majority of respondents 
at 40% agreed that 
state enterprises should 
have preferential rights 
to certain minerals or 
areas and that the state 
could sign mining 
agreements with each 
company to allow for 
individual company‟s 
flexibility whilst it 
operates in the mining 
sector through a mining 
enterprise. 
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Recommendations:  
The State should remain as the custodian of the mineral rights.  Direct State intervention is recommended but by not necessarily in 
shareholding in mining companies, but by ensuring that the key products of key strategic minerals are made available by mining 
companies for local use or for value addition prior to being exported. 
 
THE MINERAL HOSTING NATION’S REGULATORY FUNCTION 
International best practise 
 
MPRDA 2002 
MPRDA Amendment Bill 2014 Survey Results 
Sovereign nations have the 
right to accept and /or to deny 
investors into the domestic 
mineral economy.  In practice 
the areas available, how 
granting of exploration or 
mining rights is made and by 
whom and the consideration of 
the environment are the four 
factors being used as a 
The Minister has the 
authority to issue, grant, 
refuse and administer all 
rights.  The acquiring of 
rights is on a first come, 
first served basis which 
dictates that an application 
for prospecting right, 
mining right or mining 
permit has to be granted if 
The amendments now offer the 
Minister authority to regulate any 
change of control and ownership in 
both listed and unlisted companies.  
The amendments are explicit as they 
state that an entity listed or unlisted, 
which holds  prospecting or mining 
rights or an interests in those rights 
cannot cede, transfer or dispose of 
any of those rights without receiving  
On the granting of rights, all 
respondents agreed that there 
should be a mining code/law 
and regulations as the 
government principal policy 
vehicle regarding exploitation 
of the country‟s natural 
resources.  The code should 
give support to national 
priorities, give clear 
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criterion to grant permission to 
invest.  Granting permission to 
invest relies on the overall host 
nation‟s government. This 
includes all sectors of the 
economy that will be affected 
by the venture being satisfied 
with the investment proposal. 
Various methods are being 
used in a mineral regulatory 
framework to articulate the 
host nation‟s mineral policy 
objectives. In other cases 
certain regulatory devices have 
to cater for the uniqueness of a 
mineral development project.  
MA‟s are mostly used in these 
unique cases especially when 
the mineral regulatory regime 
is outdated or no longer 
there is no other application 
for the same right, for the 
matching mineral and 
territory. This is coupled 
with the Minister being able 
to illustrate the procedure 
for the allocation of these 
rights.  Private entities are 
empowered to obtain a 
permit to conduct various 
activities which include 
reconnaissance, practical 
and technical cooperation, 
mining and retention. 
Private entities have access 
to acquire prospecting, 
exploration and mining 
rights. A mining right 
should be granted 
exclusively to the holders of 
written ministerial consent.  The first 
come first served principle of 
processing of applications is replaced 
by the auctioning of rights.   
Applicants for prospecting rights are 
now compelled to comply with BEE 
objectives as enshrined in the 
amended Mining Charter.  
In relation to liquidation, the 
amendments point to an event 
whereby a holder of a right gets 
liquidated or sequestrated which 
requires the right or permit to be part 
and parcel of the insolvent estate.  
Ministerial written consent is 
required for it to be transferred to a 
new owner.  
The regulation of the domestic 
minerals sector has been 
guidelines on rehabilitation 
and BEE which should be 
broad-based, ensure that the 
state and communities 
benefit, ban and limit exports 
of raw materials and provide 
support for beneficiation 
activities, promote SMME 
development, offer incentives 
for beneficiation and foster 
competitive beneficiation 
with mining having 
preferential access to 
infrastructure. The majority 
also agree that the authority 
of granting rights should rest 
with the implementing 
executive authority, the 
DMR, who should maintain 
an open registry and grant 
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reflects contemporary political 
and economic interests.  The 
authority to grant and regulate 
mining rights should be clearly 
expressed. This authority can 
either be delegated to a 
government unit or to the 
executive authority.  Clear 
legislated guidelines are 
essential when authority to 
grant mining rights is vested in 
the executive authority. 
The competitive (tender 
process) and the free-entry 
system are generally the two 
mineral rights allocation 
methods utilised 
internationally.  To grant 
access for mineral exploitation 
host nation can either, free-up 
a prospecting or retention 
right. Renewal of 
prospecting, exploration and 
mining right is exclusively 
guaranteed to holders of 
those rights. A limitation is 
imposed on a 
reconnaissance permit in 
that the holder of such a 
permit is not granted an 
exclusive right to be offered 
a  prospecting or a mining 
right and cannot therefore 
be automatically engaged in 
prospecting or mining 
activities.   
Further, “any person who 
intends to beneficiate any 
mineral mined in the 
Republic outside the 
overwhelmed with the management 
of different holders or applicants for 
rights for different minerals 
appearing in the same ore body 
which has been termed as associated 
minerals. The associated minerals 
has been defined as follows: 
“ Any mineral which occurs in 
mineralogical association with, and in 
the same core deposit as the primary 
mineral being mined in terms of a 
mining right, where it is physically 
impossible to mine the primary mineral 
without also mining the mineral 
associated therewith.” 
 
Concentration of minerals is now a 
new term used as initially the term 
concentration of resources was used.  
This relates to decreasing the 
granting of additional rights to an 
entity that may make that entity to 
dominate in the mining industry.  
rights on a first come, first 
served basis, with no 
discretionary powers.  The 
executive authority should 
allow for an open tender 
process for available rights 
which will include rights that 
would have been relinquished 
if not used.  Transfer of 
prospecting rights to third 
parties should be allowed.  
The majority of respondents 
also agreed that financial 
information should be 
submitted when applying 
though they agree that this 
practise does discriminate 
against junior mining 
companies and HDSA 
companies. 
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known reserves, provide an 
open title-registry or provide 
mineral rights through 
standardised agreements or 
permits/leases. 
Mineral regulation is used to 
coerce the mining industry to 
compensate the host nation for 
the removal of its non-
renewable resources by using a 
variety of instruments. These 
include the imposition of 
taxes, requirements for mining 
entities contribution to 
industrial diversification and 
the creation of state owned 
mining entities. In cases where 
the state both regulates and 
participates in the mining 
industry, clear flawless 
Republic may only do so 
after written notice and in 
consultation with the 
Minister.” (MPRDA, 2002) 
In applying for a mining 
right applicants need to 
prove that they have 
required capacity to engage 
in a mineral development 
project aligned to their 
Mining Work Program 
(MWP), Environmental 
Management Plan (EMP), 
Social and Labour Plan 
(SLP) and the capacity to 
meet the legislated 
requirements of the Mine 
Health and Safety Act 29 of 
1996. 
Theoretically there are no 
The Minister is empowered to reject 
the granting of any right which the 
Minister may deem as having the 
potential to lead to a concentration of 
rights. This now applies for both a 
mining and a prospecting right.  
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legislated guidelines which 
explain the exact size of the 
government‟s stake and how 
its shares are acquired coupled 
with its roles and 
responsibilities in mineral 
development project where the 
state partners with a private 
entity should be agreed upon 
upfront. 
In order for both parties to 
share the risk associated with a 
financially intensive mineral 
investment project, the state‟s 
role and responsibilities need 
to be finalised early during the 
exploration phase of the 
project and free equity by the 
state needs to be discouraged.  
What is evident is that the 
limitations on a foreign 
entity being granted mining 
rights. However, any holder 
of a mining right has to 
adhere to the Broad Based 
Socio-Economic 
Empowerment Charter 
(Mining Charter) 
requirements of the country 
which compels the holder of 
the right to set aside 26% of 
equity to Historically 
Disadvantaged South 
Africans (HDSAs).  
Furthermore, the holder of 
the right doesn‟t have an 
exclusive real right on the 
surface in which the 
minerals are found.  It is 
encumbered to the mining 
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SMEs should be operated 
effectively as a fully-fledged 
entity that is aimed at making 
profit and also contributing to 
socio economic requirements. 
Profits generated by the SME 
should not only be used to 
fund state budgetary deficits. 
As a fully-fledged entity the 
SME should constantly 
maintain a strong balance 
sheet, be allowed to retain a 
portion of its earnings to fund 
its operational expenses and 
expansion. 
Host nations contractual 
obligations should clearly 
stipulate the terms and 
conditions for investment 
aimed at linking the mining 
rights holder to engage in 
negotiations with the 
landowner and to strike a 
negotiated settlement.  
Agreement to be given 
access to the land by the 
landowner needs to be 
concluded before the 
commencement of 
prospecting operations. 
Ministerial approval is 
requested for the use of the 
land for activities that are 
not covered by the MPRDA.  
The Minister may 
investigate any activity on 
the land which is deemed 
not to be covered by the 
right concerned at the time.  
If a party is found guilty, a 
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industry with other sectors of 
the economy.  The Indonesian 
model known as COW seems 
to be effective as it clearly 
expresses the monitoring of 
the contractual obligations 
throughout the value chain as 
it outlines the requirements 
pertaining to the exploration 
phase, the mining phase and 
mine closure.  
Mining fiscal and legislative 
arrangements may be 
established solely to provide 
certainty especially to reassure 
investors of no fiscal or 
regulatory changes if and 
when the political regime 
changes.   These agreements 
are designated as mineral 
rectification notice is served 
and implemented which also 
leads to the DMR 
conducting a comprehensive 
investigation between the 
rights holder and the 
landowner.  An unresolved 
dispute usually leads to a 
compensation being 
concluded through 
arbitration or a court 
relevant to the issue 
contested. Expropriation is 
only recommended by the 
DMR to the Minister only 
when it is deemed that the 
process will fulfil the 
MPRDA objectives.  The 
MPRDA clearly articulates 
that no mineral rights will 
  
101 
 
investment stabilisation 
agreements. The requirement 
for proof of financial and 
technical capacity from 
mineral rights applicants is 
essential but can be seen to 
discriminate against new 
entrants.  This can be resolved 
by using the first come and 
first served method to enable 
new entrants to explore, 
develop or even transfer the 
mineral right to an entity that 
has the capacity to develop it 
further. Transferability of 
mineral rights is important in 
encouraging and in growing 
exploration activities which 
increase Greenfield projects 
and a number of future mining 
be given over protected 
areas unless permission is 
granted by the Minister. 
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projects. 
 
Recommendations: 
The authority of granting and change of control and ownership of rights should remain with the executive authority with no 
discretionary powers and should be on first come, first served principle. Auctioning of rights is not recommended as the state would 
have to spend more unnecessary resources. A highly reliable mining cadastre based on a national grid or uniform mapping system is a 
key to a successful mining regime which could attract investors. State intervention should be minimal in deciding where and when to 
explore and when to move discoveries into commercial operations thus guaranteeing a security of tenure is critical. It is 
recommended that the State should consider a dual approach where explorers have the option to apply for either a time limited 
authorisation or an open-ended authorisation tied to financial obligation.  
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SECURITY OF TENURE 
International best practise MPRDA 2002 MPRDA Amendment Bill 2014 Survey Results 
It is clear from this chapter that an 
investor should be assured that the 
mineral right attained will be 
sustained for the duration of a 
project as a mineral project is 
associated with significant 
investment prior to receiving any 
returns.  It is therefore necessary 
for the host nation to develop a 
mineral policy that will promote 
the sustainable exploitation of their 
mineral resource. However, it is of 
strategic importance that both the 
interest of the investor and that of 
the host nation are satisfied. This 
can be satisfied by allowing the 
mineral right holder to develop the 
Since all mineral rights are vested 
in the state, the state guarantees 
security of tenure for a prescribed 
period under certain conditions. 
Any permit or right granted may 
not be ceded or disposed of 
without the written consent of the 
Minister, except in the case of 
change of a controlling interest in 
listed companies. All permits and 
rights can be renewed as long as 
the application states the reasons, 
period for which the renewal is 
required, be accompanied by a 
report reflecting the previous 
progress achieved or results, the 
Security of tenure is guaranteed 
as was in the MPRDA 
The majority of the 
respondents believe that 
3 years is a sufficient 
period within which to 
carry prospecting 
before applying for a 
renewal and they would 
prefer an automatic 
right to mine what is 
discovered during the 
exploration phase 
subject to compliance 
with applicable 
legislation.  The main 
requirement sighted in 
this regard is an 
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mineral resource independently 
whilst adhering to the prescribed 
regulatory requirements. Host 
nations impose a variety of 
requirements in the promotion of 
full, quick exploitation of the 
mineral resource.  However, it is 
critical for the investor to be 
assured by the host nation that the 
holder of the exploration right has 
the ultimate right to receive a 
mining right for the respective area 
of exploration. The exploration 
right should clearly indicate 
whether the right offers access to 
all the minerals in that particular 
area or is limited. However, it is 
less complicated when the 
exploration right is granted for all 
minerals.  Imposition of minimum 
requirements of the approved 
environmental management 
programme and the rehabilitation 
to be completed and the estimated 
cost thereof. 
approved 
EIA/rehabilitation plan.  
On how mining rights 
of coexisting minerals 
should be treated, the 
respondents are divided 
on whether each 
mineral should be 
treated separately or 
not.  They agreed that, 
there should be fees 
payable for a right and 
they should be 
escalated during 
exploration and mining.  
On the cancellation of 
rights, the respondents 
suggest that there 
should be clear 
guidelines, cancellation 
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fees that increase over time 
coupled with a strong monitoring 
of work of license holder are 
mostly favoured by the investors, 
but this requires a qualitative 
judgement as every project is 
unique. The procedure for the 
cancellation of a right should be 
transparent, objective and be 
explained in full at the time of 
applying.  Aligning the 
cancellation process with 
international best practise is 
preferred by investors and will go a 
long way in making the host 
nation‟s jurisdiction a preferred 
destination for investments. 
criteria should not be 
flexible and must be 
fair and be open to 
arbitration. 
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Recommendations:  
There are adequate safe guards in the MPRDA, the constitution and also access to courts are enough guarantees for the security of 
tenure and nothing further should be considered in this regard. The Amendment Bill is also moving in the right direction in regulating 
the mine dumps, but it is recommended that a transitional or a rights conversion process for mine dumps be considered as without 
such a process the amendments may constitute unlawful expropriation of existing rights over mine dumps. The Amendment Bill has 
also adequately catered for the coexisting minerals.  
 
PARTICIPATION OF NATIONALS 
International best practise MPRDA 2002 
MPRDA Amendment Bill 2014 Survey Results 
It is clear from this chapter 
that during the years, host 
nations have moved away 
from defining local content as 
local equity participation by 
the state (nationalisation of 
mines of the 1960‟s) to locals 
being offered equity.  This has 
also been recognised in the 
This is addressed mainly 
through the seven pillars of 
the Mining Charter and the 
Social and Labour Plans. 
The Social and Labour Plan 
(SLP) is a strategy aligned 
to the principles of the 
MPRDA to guarantee real 
transformation. The SLP 
Participation of nationals is still 
guided by the mining charter and 
the SLP‟s. However, the new 
section 23(2) of the amendments 
allows the Minister to be 
empowered in the process of 
granting a right to consider the 
socio-economic requirements of 
the area in which the right is being 
In the 1998 Minerals and 
Mining Policy of South 
Africa, a document also 
known as the White Paper for 
the South African Minerals 
Industry, it is reflected that 
“in terms of the Constitution, 
the State is bound to take 
legislative and other measures 
  
107 
 
African Mining Vision of 
2009.  This vision also 
emphasises the creation of 
knowledge based economies, 
the promotion of integration of 
mining industry into 
economies of host nations 
through the development of 
linkages and also the 
integration of mineral 
development projects into the 
broader national economy. 
With all the variable tools that 
host nations have at their 
disposal, they have a 
responsibility to use mining in 
developing expertise and 
experience amongst their 
populace. 
requires applicants for 
mining and production 
rights to develop and 
implement comprehensive 
Human Resources 
Development (HRD) 
Programmes, Mine 
Community Development 
Plan, Housing and Living 
Conditions Plan, 
Employment Equity Plan, 
and Downscaling and 
Retrenchment Management 
Plan. 
The Broad-Based Socio-
Economic (Mining) Charter 
has been developed with the 
primary purpose of 
promoting unbiased access 
to South Africa‟s mineral 
applied for. The Minister is 
authorised to direct the applicant 
of that right to address those socio 
economic challenges.  
The Historically Disadvantaged 
Person‟s (HDP) definition which 
in the MPRDA meant any person 
or community that was unfairly 
discriminated against before the 
new Constitution became law, has 
now being replaced with a far 
more reaching definition which 
now excludes white women. The 
new definition now explains that 
HDP‟s refers to people or a 
category or community that had 
no franchise in national elections 
before the new Constitution came 
into law which should represent 
the country‟s demographics. 
to enable the citizens to gain 
access to rights in land on an 
equitable basis.  In addition, it 
empowers the State to bring 
about land rights (including 
mineral rights) and other 
related reforms to redress the 
results of past racial 
discrimination.”  In line with 
this statement, all respondents 
affirmed this policy direction.  
The respondents agree that 
nationals where mining takes 
place, who can be trained, 
should be given relevant 
skills that can be used at the 
mines and entrepreneurs 
should be developed amongst 
them but not 
„tenderpreneurs‟.  In relation 
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assets to all South Africans 
but with emphasis to 
HDSA‟s.  The Codes of 
Good Practise for the 
Mining Industry have been 
developed to be utilised by 
all those who affect and are 
affected by the Mining 
industry with achievements 
of its elements being 
assessed by the regulator.  
Further, the mining 
companies need to maintain 
their social license to 
operate by engaging in socio 
economic impact 
assessment of the areas in 
which their mines are 
planned and develop 
programs to mitigate the 
In relation to beneficiation, the 
Minister is given authority to set 
the percentage of beneficiation 
required for every mineral and the 
costs for the value addition 
process. This will be done through 
a Ministerial notice placed in the 
government gazette. Certain 
mineral commodities will be 
deemed as strategic and through a 
Ministerial notice will be 
gazetted. Such strategic mineral 
commodities will not be exported 
without receiving written approval 
from the Minister.  
The amendments also place 
regulatory restriction on exports 
of minerals as the Minister is 
required to give written consent 
for the export of any designated 
to the development of the 
infrastructure in the areas 
where mining takes place, the 
respondents felt that this is 
the responsibility of 
government, though, the 
mining companies should 
contribute and develop a 
symbiotic relationship with 
the communities.  The rights 
of the locals should be 
respected but not at the 
expense of others.  One of the 
respondents suggested that 
government should consider 
teaching locals on their rights 
and the implication thereof.  
There are a number of 
suggestions regarding the 
HDSAs; namely, they: 
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negative socio-economic 
and environmental impact 
that may emanate from their 
operations. In this regard 
mining companies need to 
collaborate with local 
municipalities where their 
operations occur and to 
choose Local Economic 
Development (LED) 
projects illustrated in 
municipalities Integrated 
Development Plans (IDP‟s).  
Their contribution to 
community development 
projects should be 
comparable to value of their 
mining project. 
Mining companies need to 
also beneficiate mineral 
mineral mined.  
 
 Should strive to be 
operational and not 
expect handouts but 
work hard. 
 Shares be reserved for 
HDSAs. 
 HDSAs be allowed to 
develop their 
enterprises. 
 „Once empowered 
always empowered‟ 
notion should be 
applied. 
 Community trust be 
established for each 
mining area. 
 Empowerment laws 
that have negative 
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produced and contribute to 
the industrialisation of the 
country in line with section 
26 of the MPRDA. Mining 
companies can offset the 
actual value of beneficiation 
achieved against the ratio of 
their HDSA ownership 
obligations. However, these 
offsets should not exceed 
11%. 
effect on 
empowerment should 
be revised. 
 Apprenticeship 
programs be 
developed for the 
locals to offer the 
relevant skills and 
 Encourage locals to be 
involved in mineral 
beneficiation/value 
add where possible.  
Ninety per cent of the 
respondents agree that all of 
the above should be linked to  
time e.g. within the first year 
of mining, 30% of 
employable youth in the area 
should have been absorbed 
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into the apprenticeship 
scheme of mines operating in 
the area. 
Recommendations: 
Signing of Mining Agreements is critical in that MAs can allow different conditions in different circumstances unlike the current 
rigid system where one size fits all. The MPRDA should be strengthened by detailing how communities where mining is taking place 
should be involved. LEDs must be strengthened in areas of mining. Legislation must enforce the existence of implementation 
monitoring bodies that have teeth and accountable to the national government. 
In encouraging local beneficiation the state should establish, either in the form of joint ventures, beneficiation companies. It is further 
recommended that the state should incentivise beneficiation in a form of reduced royalties for all mineral depending on the level of 
beneficiation conducted in the country. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
112 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION  
International best practise MPRDA 2002 
MPRDA Amendment Bill 2014 Survey Results 
Due to a growing concern in 
finding effective solutions in 
managing the adverse effects on 
environment emanating from 
mining and other industries, the 
EIA is a management tool that 
has proven to be effective in 
managing the environment in the 
mining sector.  The EIA relies on 
the existence of an EMS which 
should be incorporated in the 
daily operational activities of the 
mine. In managing the 
environment, host nations use 
either the sectorial or the central 
All environmental issues are 
subject to the NEMA which is 
administered by the DEA and 
the MPRDA has through section 
37 incorporated the principles as 
set out in the National 
Environmental Management Act 
to ensure that prospecting and 
mining must be conducted in 
accordance with generally 
accepted principles of 
Sustainable Development by 
integrating social, economic and 
environmental factors into the 
planning and implementation 
The Bill has adopted a sectorial 
approach where the ministry 
responsible for mining is delegated 
to be responsible for the evaluation, 
approval and monitoring for 
environmental impact assessment 
and mitigation plans. In relation to 
Environmental liability the 
amended act requires that the 
holder of any rights, even a 
retention permit and a previous 
holder of an old order right or 
previous owner of work that 
stopped is still liable for all the 
environmental degradation, 
The White Paper, 
1998, recognised the 
Department of 
Environmental Affairs 
and Tourism as its 
lead agent for the role 
of environmental 
management and the 
Department of Water 
Affairs and Forestry 
as lead agent for 
national water 
resources.  However, 
the majority of 
respondents believe 
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approach depending on the 
general approach the nation has 
towards environmental 
management. There does not 
seem to be a defined method of 
deciding on either methodology 
by host nations. 
phases, in order to ensure that 
exploitation of mineral resources 
serves present and future 
generations. In 2008 an 
agreement was concluded 
between the Minister of 
Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism and the Minister of 
Minerals and Energy (as they 
then were) regarding the transfer 
of the environmental 
authorizations (EIA) function in 
respect of mining activities 
under the MPRDA to the 
Department of Environmental 
Affairs and provincial 
environment departments under 
the National Environmental 
Management Act, 1998 
(NEMA). According to this 
ecological ruin, any forms of 
pollution, the pumping and 
treatment of polluted or used water 
and the rehabilitation and closure of 
the site. Furthermore, the Minister 
will issue a certificate, bearing in 
mind that a share of the financial 
provision needs to be set aside for 
any environmental problems that 
may emerge in the future for a 
period of 20 years, after having 
received a closure certificate. 
 
that only one ministry 
should be responsible 
for both mining and 
environmental issues 
pertaining to mining 
with no separation of 
the mineral licensing 
process from the 
environmental 
permitting regime.  
However, there is an 
understanding that, 
where there is 
separation of these 
processes, mineral 
licensing should be 
granted first and the 
environmental 
considerations should 
be at once not in a 
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agreement, both Departments 
would effect the necessary 
legislative changes to the 
MPRDA and NEMA 
respectively, and that the 
transfer of function would then 
be effective 18 months from the 
date on which the last 
amendment act came into effect. 
The National Environmental 
Management Amendment Act 
62 of 2008 was promulgated on 
the 5
th
 January 2009, and came 
into effect on the 1
st
 May 2009, 
making all the necessary 
changes to NEMA. The 
Minerals and Petroleum 
Resource Development 
Amendment Act 49 of 2008 was 
promulgated on 19 April 2009.  
piecemeal.  All are in 
agreement that there 
should be financial 
guarantees in a form 
of a trust fund for 
environmental liability 
post mining and the 
contribution to such a 
fund should be done 
annually and not once 
off with the funds 
being maintained by 
private banks or the 
state.  At the end of 
the operations, the 
funds should either, be 
refunded back to the 
companies, be used 
for community 
development or be 
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kept either by an 
agency or state for 
future rehabilitation.  
Several 
recommendations 
came about on how 
environmental 
obligations should be 
treated in taxation, it 
was either that they 
should not be linked 
to tax, be tax 
deductible, not taxed 
at all or 10-15% of 
revenue be taxed for 
rehabilitation.  All 
participants were 
against self-policing 
as an option as far as 
environmental issues 
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are concerned, as they 
feared that self- 
policing would be 
open to abuse. 
 
Recommendations 
A sectorial approach is recommended, where the ministry responsible for mining is delegated to be responsible for the evaluation, 
approval and monitoring for environmental impact assessments and mitigation plans. It should be only in cases of appeal where the 
Department of Environmental Affairs (DEA) is allowed to intervene. However, the amendment and improvement of the relevant 
legislation should remain the responsibility of the DEA. The same should also apply in the case of the water licensing regime for 
mining. 
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FISCAL POLICY AND MINERAL TAXATION 
International best practise MPRDA 2002 MPRDA Amendment Bill 2014 Survey Results 
A nation‟s fiscal policy is 
responsible for illustrating 
the manner in which the state 
will collect revenue and the 
types of taxes used and how 
state funds will be spent.  In 
relation to taxation the state 
also has specific sectoral 
taxation methods.  The 
mining sector mainly 
employs three types of taxes; 
these are profit-based taxes, 
output-based taxes and input-
based taxes.  It is critical for 
the host nation‟s mineral 
policy framework to 
South Africa has a fiscal 
framework that is premised on a 
sustainable counter cyclical 
methodology towards 
administering revenue and 
expenditure which is mainly 
governed by the Tax Act. The 
mining taxable income is 
determined in accordance with 
general tax principles but with 
modifications like the capital 
redemption deduction in respect 
of mining capital expenditure, 
ring fencing provisions, the gold 
formula for gold mining taxation 
and prospecting expenditure 
Fiscal policy and taxation are outside 
the scope of the MPRDA Amendment 
Bill. However, it should be noted that 
the Minister of Finance appointed Judge 
Davis to chair a commission on taxation 
in South Africa which is expected to 
make recommendations also on the 
future mining taxation in South Africa. 
Participants would prefer 
operating in a mining 
environment where there is 
profit- based taxation and not 
output-based tax and or input-
based tax and they also 
agreed that there should be a 
specified tax holiday. 
Most indicated that the 
MPRDA is not an 
impediment though it has 
some ambiguities that need to 
be corrected.  There is a 
feeling that new entrants of 
HDSAs are being blocked in 
preference of existing HDSAs 
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articulate the taxation tools 
utilised within its domestic 
mining sector and the 
various incentives available, 
which should be globally 
competitive.  Furthermore, 
the tax regime in place must 
adhere to operational 
requirements of the mining 
industry but at the same time 
fulfil the expectations of the 
mining industry 
stakeholders.   
incurred outside the mining lease 
area may be claimable against 
mining income. 
 
in licensing. Reasons put 
forward as the cause of 
uncertainty in the South 
African mineral industry are, 
uncertainty in the legislation, 
no clear permitting system, 
never- ending debates on 
nationalisation, length of time 
spent before licenses are 
approved, labour unrests, 
expected carbon tax, 
infrastructure(rail) collapse, 
wage inflation, inconsistency 
in applying the law, 
multinationals negative about 
transformation and 
speculators.  All agreed that 
the intentions of the SLPs are 
noble, however, in practice 
little is happening indicating 
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frustrations in working with 
municipalities and traditional 
communities and not specific 
on what type of investment 
should be put and too much 
discretion, hence different 
interpretations by DMR 
officials.  A suggestion put 
forward in this regard is that 
the DMR should look at 
introducing industry 
developmental projects. 
On reasons why there is lack 
of appetite on beneficiation in 
South Africa, participants 
indicated a lack of 
commitment, lack of 
innovation, huge capex outlay 
needed and unproductive 
labour in South Africa. Due 
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to high returns on 
beneficiated products, 
multinationals beneficiate 
abroad where they pay less 
tax. Lack of infrastructure; 
high electricity costs and lack 
of skills base are some of the 
issues raised as to why 
beneficiation is not happening 
in South Africa. 
When asked what else should 
be done to ensure that all 
stakeholders benefit from 
mineral endowment of South 
Africa, participants indicated 
that there should be a 
proactive engagement by the 
DMR, compliance should be 
enforced especially on the 
SLP, free enterprise with set 
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benefits e.g. 10% going to 
community trusts based on 
positive cash flow, not profit, 
should be encouraged, 
enrichment of individuals 
should be discouraged, 
community trusts should be 
encouraged to play a role as 
BEE companies, state 
ownership should be 
encouraged, Share Option 
Schemes should be 
encouraged, and the “once 
empowered always 
empowered” notion should be 
introduced. 
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Recommendations: 
Considering the cyclical nature of the mining sector, it is recommended that a tax system based on a scale where a high percentage 
tax is paid when profits are high but diminishes with the decrease in profits of a mining operation is implemented. All minerals 
should be subjected to royalties. However, all beneficiated products should attract less royalty payments depending on the level of 
refining with the most value added products attracting no royalties. This will help in encouraging local beneficiation.
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11. RESEARCH PROJECT RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
As reflected in Table 4, changes required by the study would be minimal and can easily 
be accommodated in future amendments of the MPRDA from its current form in 
making the sector more attractive than it is currently.  This research project has 
attempted to answer its main research question which guided this study.  These 
questions and answers are discussed below and comprehensive recommendations are 
given. 
 
(a) Is the MPRDA a suitable mining legislative framework to enable the minerals 
sector to adequately contribute to the sustainable exploitation of South Africa’s 
mineral resources? 
Yes, the MPRDA is a suitable legislative framework aligned to international best 
practise.  However, it can be enhanced by incorporating the recommendations from this 
research projects which are outlined below.  
 
 (b) Have there been difficulties in the implementation of the Act? 
Yes, there are several gaps in implementation of the MPRDA which were highlighted in 
the research survey conducted.  Recommendations have been given to fill these gaps. 
 
 (c) Is there merit in looking at an alternative mineral policy and legislative 
framework that will be effective in enabling the sustainable exploitation of South 
Africa’s mineral wealth? 
There is no need for an overhaul of the entire mineral policy and legislative framework. 
However, it is necessary that continuous amendments are employed in line with lessons 
learned from practical experiences. The recommendations from this study also offer 
several areas of improvement. 
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11.1. The role of the state 
The State should remain as the custodian of the mineral rights. Direct State intervention 
is recommended but not necessarily in the direct shareholding in mining companies, but 
by ensuring that the key products of key strategic minerals are made available by 
mining companies for local use or for value addition prior to being exported. 
 
11.2. The Mineral-host nations regulatory function  
The authority of granting and change of control and ownership of rights should remain 
with the executive authority with no discretionary powers and should be on first come, 
first served principle. Auctioning of rights is not recommended as the state would have 
to spend more unnecessary resources. A highly reliable mining cadastre based on a 
national grid or uniform mapping system is key to a successful mining regime which 
could attract investors. State intervention should be minimal in deciding where and 
when to explore and when to move discoveries into commercial operations, thus 
guaranteeing a security of tenure is critical. It is recommended that the State should 
consider a dual approach where explorers have the option to apply for either a time 
limited authorisation or an open-ended authorisation tied to financial obligation.  
 
11.3. Security of tenure 
There are adequate safe guards in the MPRDA, the constitution and access to courts that 
guarantees the security of tenure and nothing further should be considered in this regard. 
The Amendment Bill is moving in the right direction in regulating mine dumps, but it is 
recommended that a transitional or a rights conversion process for mine dumps be 
considered as without such a process the amendments may constitute unlawful 
expropriation of existing rights over mine dumps.  The Amendment Bill also adequately 
addresses the critical issue of coexisting minerals. 
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11.4. Participation of Nationals 
Signing of Mining Agreements is critical and is recommended, as MAs can allow 
different conditions in different circumstances unlike the current rigid system where one 
size fits all. The MPRDA should be strengthened by detailing how communities where 
mining is taking place should be involved. LEDs must be strengthened in areas of 
mining. Legislation must enforce the existence of implementation and monitoring 
bodies that have teeth and are accountable to national government. 
In encouraging local beneficiation the state should establish beneficiation companies, in 
the form of joint ventures. It is further recommended that the state should incentivise 
beneficiation by reducing royalties for all minerals depending on the level of 
beneficiation conducted in the country. 
 
11.5. Environmental protection 
A sectorial approach is recommended, where the ministry responsible for mining is 
delegated to be responsible for the evaluation, approval and monitoring of 
environmental impact assessments and mitigation plans. It should be only in cases of 
appeal where the DEA is allowed to intervene. However, the amendment and 
improvement of the relevant legislation should remain the responsibility of the DEA.  
The same sectorial approach should also apply for the water licensing regime. 
 
11.6. Fiscal policy and Mineral Taxation 
Considering the cyclical nature of the mining sector it is recommended that a tax system 
based on a scale is implemented, where a high percentage tax is paid when profits are 
high and diminishes with the decrease in profits of a mining operation.  Further, all 
minerals should be subjected to royalties.  However, all beneficiated products should 
attract less royalty payments depending on the level of refining, with the most value 
added product attracting no royalties. This will go a long way in encouraging local 
beneficiation.
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APPENDIX I A  (Questionnaire as forwarded to the Participants) 
The future appropriate and competitive mining policy of South Africa 
 
General information 
Top of Form 
Person‟s name (Optional)            
Bottom of Form 
Top of Form 
Company or organisation type                            
Mining
 
Bottom of Form 
Top of Form 
Company ownership                     
Private but not listed
   
Bottom of Form 
Top of Form 
Number of employees:                                  
Between 11and 100
    
Bottom of Form 
Top of Form 
Your position in the company                                 
Middle management
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The role of the State in Ownership 
 
Listed below are the different roles the state can play in the mining sector, please indicate to what degree 
you agree/disagree with the statements by circling the appropriate response: 
 
 Strongly 
disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree 
The state should be the only 
custodian of Mineral rights       
The state should enforce 
mandatory joint venturing      
Private companies should have 
joint ventures with state owned 
entities as the only way to 
acquire access to mineral 
deposits 
     
The state or state enterprises 
should have preferential rights to 
certain minerals or areas  
     
The state should allow private 
parties to obtain rights to explore 
or exploit minerals in 
competition with state bodies 
     
The state should remain as an 
operator in the mining sector 
through ownership of a mining 
enterprise 
     
The state owned mining 
enterprises should be treated in 
the same manner as any other 
mining rights holder under the 
law and must compete equally 
     
All state owned enterprises in the 
minerals sector should be 
privatised 
     
The state should have no equity 
participation in the minerals 
sector  
     
Government should sign mining 
agreements with each company 
operating in its state to allow for 
individual flexibility. 
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Granting of rights 
Please use the „drop down‟ list to choose your answer 
 
Who should be delegated with the authority of granting mineral rights    
A special designated agency
 
  
Do you believe that the state should have a mining code/law and regulations as the government principal 
policy vehicle regarding exploitation of the country‟s natural resources 
 
Yes
 
 
If yes above what do you think should be contained in the mining code      
      
If no above how should the mineral resources exploitation be regulated 
 
Should the state maintain an open registry i.e. providing access to information about which areas are 
available, taken and which applications are pending  
Yes
 
  
Grant rights in a first come first served basis/ some non-discretionary basis      
Yes
 
 
Allow transfers of prospecting rights to 3
rd
 parties   
Yes
 
 
Allow for an open tender for available rights    
Yes
 
 
 
Allow for a close bidding process for available rights   
Yes
 
 
Providing rights through standardized agreements or contracts/permits/leases  
Yes
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Is it necessary to submit technical information with the applications of prospecting and mining rights 
submission    
Yes
 
 
Is it necessary to submit financial information with exploration and mining rights submission 
             
Yes
 
          
Does submission of both technical and financial information tend to favour majors and discriminate 
against junior mining companies and HDSA‟s companies      
            
Yes
 
 
Should transferability of prospecting and mining rights be not restricted in order to encourage active 
exploration programmes    
Yes
   
 
First come first serve principle with no restriction at all                      
Yes
  
  
Should RSA enforce/encourage relinquishment of rights if not used at a forced rate e.g. 1
st
 year 25%, 2
nd
 
year 50% etc. or use escalation in the annual renewal for exploration areas 
Enforce
 
 
Allow transfer of exploration right to 3
rd
 parties or sell                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Security of Tenure 
Please use the „drop down‟ list to choose your answer 
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What is a sufficient period within which to carry prospect before applying for a renewal    
  
2 years
 
 
Do you prefer automatic right to mine what is discovered subject to compliance with applicable 
regulations 
Yes
 
  
As a mining company as far as the security of tenure is concerned what would you prefer for prospecting 
Escalating annual work commitment
   
  
As a prospecting right holder 
 
Is it good to have an exclusive right to obtain a mining right within your exploration area without 
demonstrating any further commercial, technical or financial ability to develop it or you should also have 
the following: 
 
Approved EIA/rehabilitation plan
 
 
How should the mining right of coexisting minerals be treated 
The right be treated as one for both minerals
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E. Fees payable 
Please use the „drop down‟ list to choose your answer 
 
Should there be fees payable depending on the size of the prospecting/mining area 
 
 
Should these be escalated during subsequence years of exploration and/ mining. 
Yes
 
            
Should fees be set at a minimum amount to be spent by a company allocated an area for prospecting or 
mining that escalates over time 
 
 
Cancellation of rights – what mechanism should be put in place in order to have a clear and transparent 
process in the cancellation of right? E.g. open to arbitration process recourse to local judicial process, 
international arbitration process. 
    
Participation of Nationals/ Natives/ Aborigines/ HDSA „s 
In your own words give an indication of your preferences 
 
Your attitude towards employment of locals and training them to achieve required levels for operations. 
      
       
Developing local entrepreneurs who can supply the mining activities in the area 
 
Empower locals to participate in mineral beneficiation/increase value addition 
     
Encouraging for the processing of minerals 
 
 
 
Provision of service not directly related to mining e.g. medical care and educational for local people
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Protection of rights of locals    
 
  
Development of local infrastructure       
  
Should the above be tied to time            
Yes
 
 
How else could HDSA participate in the sector 
 
 
Environment 
Please use the „drop down‟ list to choose your answer 
 
Do you prefer a central approach i.e. only one ministry responsible for all mining issues and 
environmental issues pertaining to mining only 
Yes
 
 
 
Do you prefer a sectorial approach where responsibilities for the evaluation, approval and monitoring for 
EIA and mitigation plans goes to the Sector ministry 
Yes
 
 
 
Do you prefer separation between mineral licensing process  from Environmental permitting regime 
Yes
 
 
 
Where they‟re separated should mineral licensing be guaranteed first    
Yes
  
 
  
 
 
Where they‟re separated should Environment permitting regime be first 
Yes
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Should all environmental considerations pertaining to mining be conducted by a single environmental 
ministry be done in a piece meal 
Yes
 
 
Should environmental considerations be done at once for all mining work to be undertaken. 
 
Should there be environmental financial guarantees in a form of Trust funds 
Yes
 
   
If yes: 
Should the contribution be annually   
Yes
 
    
Should the contribution be  once off         
Yes
 
   
What quantum of contribution          
30%
           
 
Who should maintain the funds                      
Mining house
 
 
What should happen to the funds at the end of operation 
 
How should environmental obligations be treated in taxation   
 
Is self policing an option as far as environmental users are concerned    
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Fiscal policy and mineral Taxation (Tax holiday – how long) 
Please use the „drop down‟ list to choose your answer 
Would you prefer operating in a mining environment where there is: 
Profit based taxation   – inclusive of corporate income taxes, dividend taxes and additional profit taxes 
Yes
 
 
Output based taxation – e.g. royalties usually related to the sales value of mining production 
Yes
 
 
Input based taxation – There are levies on inputs to the mining process and includes sales transactions or 
withholding taxes, import duties on capital equipment or suppliers and labour and wage related tax 
payment 
Yes
 
 
Should there be a specified tax holiday    
Yes
                                    
  
     
General 
Please fill in the blanks in your own words 
 
What do you think causes uncertainty in the South African Minerals sector 
  
 
Why do you think there is lack of appetite for beneficiation in South Africa
  
 
Is the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) an impediment to the mining sector
  
 
Is the lack of capacity in the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) an impediment  
  
 
Is the social and labour plan a good tool in redressing some of the socio-economic ills of the past 
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What else should be done to ensure that all stakeholders benefit from minerals endowment of South 
Africa 
 
      
Bottom of Form 
 
 
Thank you for answering the questionnaire if you are interested in receiving feedback  
please forward your contact details when forwarding this form. 
 
Top of Form 
Bottom of Form 
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APPENDIX I B  (Questionnaire showing all questions and possible answers) 
 
The future appropriate and competitive mining policy of South Africa 
A. General information 
1. Company or organisation type 
- Exploration 
- Mining 
- Smelter 
- Beneficiator 
- Regulatory 
- Other 
2. Company ownership                      
- Listed 
- Private but not listed 
- State owned 
- Other 
3. Number of employees                      
- Less than 10 
- Between 11and 100 
- 100-1000 
- 1000-2000 
- Above 2000 
4. Your position in the company                                  
- Senior management 
- Middle management 
- Senior supervisory 
- Supervisory 
- Professional 
B. The role of the State in Ownership 
Listed below are the different roles the state can play in the mining sector, please indicate to what 
degree you agree/disagree with the statements. 
 The state should be the only custodian of Mineral rights  
- Strongly disagree 
- Disagree 
- Neutral 
- Agree  
- Strongly agree 
 The state should enforce mandatory joint venturing 
- Strongly disagree 
- Disagree 
- Neutral 
- Agree  
- Strongly agree 
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 Private companies should have joint ventures with state owned entities as the only way to acquire access 
to mineral deposits 
- Strongly disagree 
- Disagree 
- Neutral 
- Agree  
- Strongly agree 
 The state or state enterprises should have preferential rights to certain minerals or areas  
- Strongly disagree 
- Disagree 
- Neutral 
- Agree  
- Strongly agree 
 The state should allow private parties to obtain rights to explore or exploit minerals in competition with 
state bodies 
- Strongly disagree 
- Disagree 
- Neutral 
- Agree  
- Strongly agree 
 The state should remain as an operator in the mining sector through ownership of a mining enterprise 
- Strongly disagree 
- Disagree 
- Neutral 
- Agree  
- Strongly agree 
 The state owned mining enterprises should be treated in the same manner as any other mining rights 
holder under the law and must compete equally 
- Strongly disagree 
- Disagree 
- Neutral 
- Agree  
- Strongly agree 
 All state owned enterprises in the minerals sector should be privatized 
- Strongly disagree 
- Disagree 
- Neutral 
- Agree  
- Strongly agree 
 The state should have no equity participation in the minerals sector  
- Strongly disagree 
- Disagree 
- Neutral 
- Agree  
- Strongly agree 
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 Government should sign mining agreements with each company operating in its state to allow for 
individual flexibility. 
- Strongly disagree 
- Disagree 
- Neutral 
- Agree  
- Strongly agree 
C. Granting of rights 
 Who should be delegated with the authority of granting mineral rights   
- Implementing executive authority (e.g. the DMR) 
- Government officials with clear guidelines / with no discretion 
- A special designated agency 
 Do you believe that the state should have a mining code/law and regulations as the government 
principal policy vehicle regarding exploitation of the country‟s natural resources 
- Yes 
- No 
 If yes above what do you think should be contained in the mining code   
 
 If no above how should the mineral resources exploitation be regulated 
 
 Should the state maintain an open registry i.e. providing access to information about which areas are 
available, taken and which applications are pending 
- Yes 
- No 
 Grant rights on a first come first served basis/ some non-discretionary basis 
- Yes 
- No 
 Allow transfers of prospecting rights to 3rd parties   
- Yes 
- No 
 Allow for an open tender for available rights  
- Yes 
- No 
 Allow for a close bidding process for available rights  
- Yes 
- No 
 Providing rights through standardized agreements or contracts/ permits/ leases  
- Yes 
- No 
 Is it necessary to submit technical information with the applications of prospecting and mining rights 
submission  
- Yes 
- No 
 Is it necessary to submit financial information with exploration and mining rights submission 
- Yes 
- No 
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 Does submission of both technical and financial information tend to favour majors and discriminate 
against junior mining companies and HDSA‟s companies   
- Yes 
- No 
 Should transferability of prospecting and mining rights be not restricted in order to encourage active 
exploration programmes 
- Yes 
- No 
 First come first serve principle with no restriction at all 
- Yes 
- No 
 Should RSA enforce/encourage relinquishment of rights if not used at a forced rate e.g. 1st year 25%, 
2nd year 50% etc. or use escalation in the annual renewal for exploration areas 
- Enforce 
- Encourage 
- Use escalation in the annual renewal for changed exploration 
 Allow transfer of exploration right to 3rd parties or sell     
- Transfer 
- Sell 
D. Security of Tenure 
 What is a sufficient period within which to carry prospect before applying for a renewal    
  
- 2 years 
- 3years 
- 5years 
- >5years 
 Do you prefer automatic right to mine what is discovered subject to compliance with applicable 
regulations 
- Yes 
- No 
 As a mining company as far as the security of tenure is concerned what would you prefer for 
prospecting 
- Open ended 
- Long duration exploration term with a minimum work commitment 
- Escalating annual work commitment 
- Land rental escalating 
- Approved work plan 
- Extension to defined exploration tenure where there is an extended period of tenure. This can be 
automatic/ discretionary extension 
- A dual approval of the two above 
E. As a prospecting right holder 
 Is it good to have an exclusive right to obtain a mining right within your exploration area without 
demonstrating any further commercial, technical or financial ability to develop it or you should also 
have the following: 
- Approved EIA/rehabilitation plan 
- Mining rights be truly transferable to 3rd parties 
- No automatic progression guaranteed 
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 How should the mining right of coexisting minerals be treated 
- Each mineral be treated as a separate right 
- The right be treated as one for both minerals 
F. Fees payable 
 Should there be fees payable depending on the size of the prospecting/mining area 
- Yes 
- No 
 Should these be escalated during subsequence years of exploration and/ mining. 
- Yes 
- No 
 Should fees be set at a minimum amount to be spent by a company allocated an area for prospecting or 
mining that escalates over time 
- Yes 
- No 
 Cancellation of rights – what mechanism should be put in place in order to have a clear and transparent 
process in the cancellation of right? e.g. open to arbitration process recourse to local judicial process, 
international arbitration process. 
 
G. Participation of Nationals/ Natives/ Aborigines/ HDSA ‘s 
In your own words give an indication of your preferences 
 Your attitude towards employment of locals and training them to achieve required levels for operations. 
 
 Developing local entrepreneurs who can supply the mining activities in the area 
 
 Empower locals to participate in mineral beneficiation/increase value addition  
 
 Encouraging for the processing of minerals  
 
 Provision of service not directly related to mining e.g. medical care and educational for local people 
 
 
 Protection of rights of locals       
 
 Development of local infrastructure        
 
 Should the above be tied to time  
- Yes 
- No 
 How else could HDSA participate in the sector 
 
H. Environment 
 Do you prefer a central approach i.e. only one ministry responsible for all mining issues and 
environmental issues pertaining to mining only 
- Yes 
- No 
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 Do you prefer a sectorial approach where responsibilities for the evaluation, approval and monitoring 
for EIA and mitigation plans goes to the Sector ministry 
- Yes 
- No 
 Do you prefer separation between mineral licensing process from Environmental permitting regime 
- Yes 
- No 
 Where they‟re separated should mineral licensing be guaranteed first  
- Yes 
- No 
 Where they‟re separated should Environment permitting regime be first 
- Yes 
- No 
 Should all environmental considerations pertaining to mining be conducted by a single environmental 
ministry be done in a piece meal 
- Yes 
- No 
 Should environmental considerations be done at once for all mining work to be undertaken. 
- Yes 
- No 
 Should there be environmental financial guarantees in a form of Trust funds 
- Yes 
- No 
If yes: 
 Should the contribution be annually 
- Yes 
- No 
 Should the contribution be  once off  
- Yes 
- No 
 What quantum of contribution   
- 30% 
- 50% to 70% 
- 100% 
- above 100% 
 Who should maintain the funds  
- Mining house 
- Government 
- Special agency 
- Private Banks           
 What should happen to the funds at the end of operation 
 
 How should environmental obligations be treated in taxation 
 
 Is self-policing an option as far as environmental users are concerned 
 
  
149 
 
 
I. Fiscal policy and mineral Taxation (Tax holiday – how long) 
Would you prefer operating in a mining environment where there is: 
 Profit based taxation – inclusive of corporate income taxes, dividend taxes and additional profit taxes 
- Yes 
- No 
 Output based taxation – e.g. royalties usually related to the sales value of mining production 
- Yes 
- No 
 Input based taxation – There are levies on inputs to the mining process and includes sales transactions 
or withholding taxes, import duties on capital equipment or suppliers and labour and wage related tax 
payment 
- Yes 
- No 
 Should there be a specified tax holiday 
- Yes 
- No 
J. General 
 What do you think causes uncertainty in the South African Minerals sector 
 
 Why do you think there is lack of appetite for beneficiation in South Africa 
 
 Is the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) an impediment to the mining 
sector  
 
 Is the lack of capacity in the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) an impediment 
 
 Is the social and labour plan a good tool in redressing some of the socio-economic ills of the past 
   
 
 What else should be done to ensure that all stakeholders benefit from minerals endowment of South 
Africa 
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APPENDIX II  (Survey results) 
The future appropriate and competitive mining policy of South Africa 
 
K. General information 
Results 
5. Company or organisation type 
 
- Exploration 
10% 
- Mining 
60% 
- Smelter 
0% 
- Beneficiator 
0% 
- Regulatory 
0% 
- Other 
30% 
6. Company ownership                      
 
- Listed 
30% 
- Private but not listed 
60% 
- State owned 
0% 
- Other 
10% 
7. Number of employees                      
 
- Less than 10 
20% 
- Between 11and 100 
20% 
- 100-1000 
10% 
- 1000-2000 
10% 
- Above 2000 
40% 
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8. Your position in the company                                  
Results 
- Senior management & Executives 
90% 
- Middle management 
0% 
- Senior supervisory 
0% 
- Supervisory 
10% 
- Professional 
0% 
L. The role of the State in Ownership 
Listed below are the different roles the state can play in the mining sector, 
please indicate to what degree you agree/disagree with the statements. 
 
 The state should be the only custodian of Mineral rights   
- Strongly disagree 
20% 
- Disagree 
20% 
- Neutral 
10% 
- Agree  
20% 
- Strongly agree 
30% 
 The state should enforce mandatory joint venturing  
- Strongly disagree 
0% 
- Disagree 
20% 
- Neutral 
10% 
- Agree  
40% 
- Strongly agree 
30% 
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 Private companies should have joint ventures with state owned entities as the 
only way to acquire access to mineral deposits 
Results 
- Strongly disagree 
10% 
- Disagree 
70% 
- Neutral 
0% 
- Agree  
10% 
- Strongly agree  
10% 
 The state or state enterprises should have preferential rights to certain minerals 
or areas  
 
- Strongly disagree 
10% 
- Disagree 
40% 
- Neutral 
20% 
- Agree  
10% 
- Strongly agree 
20% 
 The state should allow private parties to obtain rights to explore or exploit 
minerals in competition with state bodies 
 
- Strongly disagree 
0% 
- Disagree 
0% 
- Neutral 
30% 
- Agree  
0% 
- Strongly agree 
70% 
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 The state should remain as an operator in the mining sector through ownership 
of a mining enterprise 
Results 
- Strongly disagree 
0% 
- Disagree 
40% 
- Neutral 
10% 
- Agree  
10% 
- Strongly agree 
40% 
 The state owned mining enterprises should be treated in the same manner as any 
other mining rights holder under the law and must compete equally 
 
- Strongly disagree 
0% 
- Disagree 
40% 
- Neutral 
10% 
- Agree  
40% 
- Strongly agree 
10% 
 All state owned enterprises in the minerals sector should be privatized  
- Strongly disagree 
30% 
- Disagree 
30% 
- Neutral 
10% 
- Agree  
20% 
- Strongly agree 
10% 
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 The state should have no equity participation in the minerals sector  Results 
- Strongly disagree 
30% 
- Disagree 
50% 
- Neutral 
0% 
- Agree  
20% 
- Strongly agree 
0% 
 Government should sign mining agreements with each company operating in its 
state to allow for individual flexibility. 
 
- Strongly disagree 
20% 
- Disagree 
20% 
- Neutral 
30% 
- Agree  
20% 
- Strongly agree 
10% 
M. Granting of rights 
 
 Who should be delegated with the authority of granting mineral rights    
- Implementing executive authority (e.g. the DMR) 
60% 
- Government officials with clear guidelines / with no discretion 
10% 
- A special designated agency 
30% 
 Do you believe that the state should have a mining code/law and regulations as 
the government principal policy vehicle regarding exploitation of the country‟s 
natural resources 
 
- Yes 
100% 
- No 
0% 
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 If yes above what do you think should be contained in the mining code   Results 
- Incentive for beneficiation foster competitive beneficiation preferential 
access to infrastructure  
- Ban an export of raw; state have equity, SMME promotion; clear scope of 
the law  
- Support to national priorities, clear guidelines also on rehabilitation; clear 
codes for BEE; Incentives for beneficiation, foster competitive 
beneficiation 
 
- Preferential access to infrastructure 
 
 If no above how should the mineral resources exploitation be regulated N/A 
 Should the state maintain an open registry i.e. providing access to information 
about which areas are available, taken and which applications are pending 
 
- Yes 
90% 
- No 
10% 
 Grant rights on a first come first served basis/ some non-discretionary basis  
- Yes 
90% 
- No 
10% 
 Allow transfers of prospecting rights to 3rd parties    
- Yes 
70% 
- No 
20% 
- Unknown 
10% 
 Allow for an open tender for available rights   
- Yes 
60% 
- No 
40% 
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 Allow for a close bidding process for available rights  Results 
- Yes 
20% 
- No 
60% 
- Unknown 
20% 
 Providing rights through standardized agreements or contracts/ permits/ leases   
- Yes 
90% 
- No 
10% 
 Is it necessary to submit technical information with the applications of 
prospecting and mining rights submission  
 
- Yes 
90% 
- No 
10% 
 Is it necessary to submit financial information with exploration and mining 
rights submission 
 
- Yes 
90% 
- No 
10% 
 Does submission of both technical and financial information tend to favour 
majors and discriminate against junior mining companies and HDSA‟s 
companies   
 
- Yes 
80% 
- No 
20% 
 Should transferability of prospecting and mining rights be not restricted in order 
to encourage active exploration programmes 
 
- Yes 
50% 
- No 
50% 
 First come first serve principle with no restriction at all  
- Yes 
50% 
- No 
50% 
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 Should RSA enforce/encourage relinquishment of rights if not used at a forced 
rate e.g. 1st year 25%, 2nd year 50% etc. or use escalation in the annual renewal 
for exploration areas 
Results 
- Enforce 
80% 
- Encourage 
20% 
- Use escalation in the annual renewal for changed exploration 
0% 
 Allow transfer of exploration right to 3rd parties or sell      
- Transfer 
20% 
- Sell 
20% 
- Unknown 
60% 
N. Security of Tenure 
 
 What is a sufficient period within which to carry prospect before applying for a 
renewal      
 
- 2 years 
20% 
- 3years 
60% 
- 5years 
20% 
- >5years 
0% 
 Do you prefer automatic right to mine what is discovered subject to compliance 
with applicable regulations 
 
- Yes 
70% 
- No 
30% 
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 As a mining company as far as the security of tenure is concerned what would 
you prefer for prospecting 
Results 
- Open ended 
0% 
- Long duration exploration term with a minimum work commitment 
10% 
- Escalating annual work commitment 
20% 
- Land rental escalating 
0% 
- Approved work plan 
20% 
- Extension to defined exploration tenure where there is an extended period 
of tenure. This can be automatic/ discretionary extension 30% 
- A dual approval of the two above 
20% 
As a prospecting right holder  
 Is it good to have an exclusive right to obtain a mining right within your 
exploration area without demonstrating any further commercial, technical or 
financial ability to develop it or you should also have the following: 
 
 
- Approved EIA/rehabilitation plan 
60% 
- Mining rights be truly transferable to 3rd parties 
20% 
- No automatic progression guaranteed 
20% 
 How should the mining right of coexisting minerals be treated  
- Each mineral be treated as a separate right 
50% 
- The right be treated as one for both minerals 
50% 
O. Fees payable 
 
 Should there be fees payable depending on the size of the 
prospecting/mining area 
 
- Yes 
100% 
- No 
0% 
 Should these be escalated during subsequence years of exploration and/ mining.  
- Yes 
70% 
- No 
30% 
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 Should fees be set at a minimum amount to be spent by a company allocated an 
area for prospecting or mining that escalates over time 
Results 
- Yes 
20% 
- No 
20% 
- Unknown 
60% 
 Cancellation of rights – what mechanism should be put in place in order to have 
a clear and transparent process in the cancellation of right? e.g. open to 
arbitration process recourse to local judicial process, international arbitration 
process. 
 
- Fair as per constitution open to arbitration 
 
- Clarity and non- flexibility of cancellation criteria 
 
- Should be clear guidelines/milestones arbitration; discretion of state 
 
P. Participation of Nationals/ Natives/ Aborigines/ HDSA ‘s 
In your own words give an indication of your preferences 
 
 Your attitude towards employment of locals and training them to achieve 
required levels for operations. 
 
- Train and employ depending on their skills 
 
- Train those that are trainable 
 
 Developing local entrepreneurs who can supply the mining activities in the area  
- Set a percentage 
 
- Should be nurtured but not tenderpreneurs  
 
- Can assist in job creation 
 
 Empower locals to participate in mineral beneficiation/increase value addition
  
 
- Set a target percentage 
 
- Yes if they have skills 
 
- Compulsory 
 
- Yes depending on commodities 
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 Encouraging for the processing of minerals  Results 
- Yes if viable need incentives 
 
- Yes all should process minerals 
 
- A must yes if we can be competitive; yes if it would help in combating 
ghost towns 
 
- Yes subject to competitiveness 
 
 Provision of service not directly related to mining e.g. medical care and 
educational for local people   
Results 
- Set a percentage target 
 
- Yes there should be symbiotic relationship 
 
- Outsource to create jobs 
 
- JV between state and mining company 
 
 Protection of rights of locals        
- Yes if skills available 
 
- State to create agency to educate locals on rights 
 
- Yes train the trainable locals 
 
 Development of local infrastructure      
  
 
- Yes set a target percentage 
 
- Private sector should contribute 
 
- Yes education and training compulsory 
 
- Responsibility of the state 
 
 Should the above be tied to time   
- Yes 
90% 
- No 
10% 
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 How else could HDSA participate in the sector Results 
- Improving themselves  
 
- Not expect hand outs  
 
- Enterprise development and once empowered always empowered 
 
- Community trust 
 
- Reserve shares for HDSA only 
 
- Be operational increase level of entrepreneurship in HDSA‟s  
 
- Through apprenticeship programs  
 
- Revision of empowerment laws that have negative effect to empowerment  
 
- By shareholding for the development of the area  
 
- Development of spatial development framework  
 
Q. Environment 
 
 Do you prefer a central approach i.e. only one ministry responsible for all 
mining issues and environmental issues pertaining to mining only 
 
- Yes 
90% 
- No 
10% 
 Do you prefer a sectorial approach where responsibilities for the evaluation, 
approval and monitoring for EIA and mitigation plans goes to the Sector 
ministry 
 
- Yes 
40% 
- No 
60% 
 Do you prefer separation between mineral licensing process from 
Environmental permitting regime 
 
- Yes 
20% 
- No 
80% 
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 Where they‟re separated should mineral licensing be guaranteed first  Results 
- Yes 
80% 
- No 
20% 
 Where they‟re separated should Environment permitting regime be first  
- Yes 
20% 
- No 
80% 
 Should all environmental considerations pertaining to mining be conducted by a 
single environmental ministry be done in a piece meal 
 
- Yes 
40% 
- No 
60% 
 Should environmental considerations be done at once for all mining work to be 
undertaken. 
 
- Yes 
70% 
- No 
30% 
 Should there be environmental financial guarantees in a form of Trust funds  
- Yes 
100% 
- No 
0% 
If yes:  
 Should the contribution be annually  
- Yes 
100% 
- No 
0% 
 Should the contribution be  once off   
- Yes 
20% 
- No 
80% 
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 What quantum of contribution   Results 
- 30% 
80% 
- 50% to 70% 
10% 
- 100% 
0% 
- above 100% 
10% 
 Who should maintain the funds   
- Mining house 
10% 
- Government 
30% 
- Special agency 
20% 
- Private Banks           
40% 
 What should happen to the funds at the end of operation  
- Rehab and community development balance back to company  
 
- Refunded after rehabilitation  
 
- Kept by government for future rehabilitation  
 
- Returned to contributors  
 
- Reconciled to actual liability  
 
- Use it for rehab  
 
 How should environmental obligations be treated in taxation  
- Not linked  
 
- Tax incentive  
 
- Tax deductable  
 
- Must have a tax benefit  
 
- 10–15% revenue taxed for rehabilitation 
 
- Not taxed at all  
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 Is self-policing an option as far as environmental users are concerned Results 
- Yes with 3rd party monitoring  
 
- Yes  
 
-  No open to abuse 
 
R. Fiscal policy and mineral Taxation (Tax holiday – how long) 
Would you prefer operating in a mining environment where there is: 
 
 Profit based taxation – inclusive of corporate income taxes, dividend taxes and 
additional profit taxes 
 
- Yes 
90% 
- No 
10% 
 Output based taxation – e.g. royalties usually related to the sales value of mining 
production 
 
- Yes 
20% 
- No 
80% 
 Input based taxation – There are levies on inputs to the mining process and 
includes sales transactions or withholding taxes, import duties on capital 
equipment or suppliers and labour and wage related tax payment 
 
- Yes 
30% 
- No 
60% 
- Unknown 
10% 
 Should there be a specified tax holiday  
- Yes 
70% 
- No 
20% 
- Unknown 
10% 
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S. General 
Results 
 What do you think causes uncertainty in the South African Minerals sector  
- No clear permitting system uncertainty in legislatures   
 
- Never ending debates    
 
- Nationalisation   
 
- Length of time to improve   
 
- Labour unrest, infrastructure rail collapse, carbon taxes, wage inflation   
 
- Speculators, multinationals negative about transformation   
 
- Labour dynamics and policy interpretation   
 
- Flawed legislation opportunistic multi nationals ambiguity in legislation 
industries  
- Corruption at DMR   
 
- Inconsistence in applying the law   
 
 Why do you think there is lack of appetite for beneficiation in South Africa  
- Fair domestic industries 
 
- No clear rules 
 
- Lack of commitment and innovation    
 
- Labour unproductive huge Capex demand 
 
- Vested interest   
 
- Lack of electricity   
 
- Unfair labour practice   
 
- High return hence repatriate to abroad where tax is less   
 
- Overseas infrastructure PGM are well established   
 
- Not enough research done 
 
- Lack of skills base 
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 Is the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act (MPRDA) an 
impediment to the mining sector  
Results 
- To an extent allowing individuals to remain BEE‟s  and also allowing new 
BEE‟s  
- No but can be improved 
 
- No 
 
- Yes 
 
- No but sort ambiguity  
 
- No but sort ambiguity    
 
- Partly, as its not specific in part    
 
 Is the lack of capacity in the Department of Mineral Resources (DMR) an 
impediment 
 
- Yes very serious 
 
- Yes most employees never ever worked on the mines 
 
 Is the social and labour plan a good tool in redressing some of the socio-
economic ills of the past    
 
- Not good enough look into industrial projects 
 
- Good but implementation  
 
- Yes should be transparent 
 
- Yes but too discretionary to officials 
 
- Not sure  
 
- In theory yes 
 
- Not clear as to what investment should be put  
 
- Intent good but practical problem with municipalities  
 
- Traditional communities not organized 
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 What else should be done to ensure that all stakeholders benefit from minerals 
endowment of South Africa 
Results 
- First come first served no favours 
 
- Enrichment of individuals discouraged  
 
- Once empowered already be introduced 
 
- Proactive engagement by DMR 
 
- Full enterprise with set benefits e.g. 10% going to community Trust based 
on 
positive cash flow not profit 
 
- Enforce compliance especially on labour plans 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
